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Abstract  
The purpose of this study is to explore the role of capital ships in U.S. naval strategy from the 
end of the Cold War until this day.  
The study analyses the capital ships’ role within U.S. naval strategy and how this has 
developed over time. Furthermore the study discusses the future of the supercarrier as the U.S. 
capital ship.  
An unambiguous definition of what a capital ship actually is does not exist. The study has 
therefore used a comparative historic approach in order to define the capital ship.  
 
The definition is: They are the most important ships of their time, they ensure conditions that 
permit other forces or functions to perform their respective role. In wartime, capital ships 
secure the use of the sea.  
 
The study is explorative and answers the research question through a qualitative approach and 
uses theory of naval strategy and Ken Booth’s Naval Trinity as the analytical framework.  
 
The results show, that the supercarrier has been elevated to almost mythological status in the 
U.S. Navy and institutions, and it will probably take a major war to challenge this status.  
The supercarrier has become a symbol of U.S. supremacy, and the pillar on which all U.S. 
naval strategic thinking is done.  
 
However, with the advent of near peer completion on the world’s oceans the Navy is now 
struggling to define its military role.  
Its role as a tool of diplomacy on the other hand is very well defined and value-laden.  
 
It was once stated, “capital ships are built to prevent war”, and the U.S. is certainly placing a 
lot of faith on this approach. 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
V 
Danish Abstract  
Formålet med denne masteropgave er at studere the capital ships rolle i amerikansk 
flådestrategi siden den Kolde Krig. 
Opgaven analyserer the capital ships rolle i indenfor amerikansk flådestrategi samt, hvordan 
denne har udviklet sig over tid. Derudover, diskuteres supercarrier’ens fremtid som 
amerikansk capital ship.  
Der findes ikke en entydig definition på hvad et capital ship egentlig er. Opgaven har derfor 
gennem en historisk komparativ tilgang udarbejdet en definition. 
 
Definitionen lyder: De er deres samtids vigtigste skibe, de sikrer tilstande, som tillader andre 
styrker at gennemføre deres roller. I krigstid, er det capital ships der sikrer evnen til at 
benytte havet.   
 
Studien undersøger problemformuleringen gennem en kvalitativ tilgang og benytter maritim 
teori og Ken Booths maritime treenighed som analytisk rammeværk.  
 
Resultaterne viser, at supercarrier’en er blevet ophøjet til nærmest mytologisk status i den 
amerikanske flåde og i amerikanske institutioner. Det vil givetvis kræve en større krig hvis 
dette paradigme skal udfordres for alvor.  
Supercarrier’en er blevet symbolet på amerikansk overlegenhed og grundlaget for al 
amerikansk maritim strategisk tænkning.  
 
Det faktum at andre magter nu er trådt ind på den globale scene har medført, at den 
amerikanske flåde nu har vanskeligt ved at beskrive dette skibs militære rolle.  
Som et diplomatisk redskab er skibets rolle med veldefineret og værdiladet.  
Dr. Tim Benbow har en gang udtrykt, at ”capital ships bliver bygget med det formål at undgå 
krig”. Denne tilgang tillægger USA utvivlsomt stor betydning.  
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1 
1 Introduction 
 
“The Master of the sea must inevitably be Master of the empire” 
        Cicero (Vego, 2016, p. 18) 
 
It has been an existing paradigm for more than 2000 years that he who masters the sea will 
also master the empire, or even the world. The point being that mastery of the sea enables the 
master to influence the world.  
 
Navies of course are, the toolbox with which one gains this empowering mastery. 
Historically, there has been one tool in this box that mattered more than the others. This was 
the capital ship. From Nelson’s HMS Victory of the wooden world, to HMS Warrior and HMS 
Dreadnought of the newly industrialised world, to the aircraft carriers during the Second 
World War, capital ships have been the one tool in the great navies’ toolbox that gave them 
the edge in peacetime and in war. Immensely prestigious and powerful they represented the 
pinnacle of fleet design. Capital ships had significant strategic value as well, they could both 
deter wars or be the centrepiece in an arms race that could lead to war.   
 
The term the capital ship has never been fully defined and different writers and thinkers have 
used it in different ways. In 1922 the term was formally used in the Washington Naval Treaty, 
but this was related to size, and it was specifically mentioned that aircraft carriers were not 
capital ships.   
 
In 2004 the British military historian John Keegan offered his definition, and declared the 
term obsolete1 (Keegan, 2004, p. 276). Nevertheless, the term is still frequently used today 
and usually in connection with the U.S. aircraft carriers, although there are some that argue 
that it is the submarine or something completely different (Hart & Lind, 1986, p. 90).  
 
Technology has always been an important part of great navies and the capital ships were 
traditionally the pinnacle of technology. Today other ships, like the U.S. Aegis fitted cruisers 
                                                
1 Keegan did not offer any explanation as to why the term in his opinion was obsolete. 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
2 
and destroyers are the only ships with anti-ballistic missile technology. A characteristic that 
has led to these ships becoming strategic significant in their own right as well.    
Regardless of these discussions, capital ships have historically been an important part the 
most powerful navies and therefore also an important part of their naval strategies. 
 
As the Cold War ended, the United States was the world’s only superpower. The U.S. Navy 
were now presented with the challenge of formulating naval strategy in a security 
environment where there were no significant adversaries and consequently no opponents for 
its capital ships to counter.    
 
In the following decades the U.S. capital ship – the supercarrier – became the symbol of 
American supremacy as these ships were used around the world to project American Power.  
September 11th 2001, an adversary appeared and the United States went to war, but the U.S. 
Navy was still presented with the challenge of formulating strategy without having an enemy 
at sea.  
 
Then came a time where great power competition returned to world politics and with this 
followed the prospect of near-peer adversaries at sea.  
 
The decades following the Cold War present significant changes in the security situation and 
thus very different challenges when formulating naval strategy. The principles behind the 
nuclear powered aircraft carrier has not changed significantly since the first Nimitz-class 
supercarrier was launched in 1975. The navy around the carrier and the strategic 
circumstances in which it operates, however, have changed significantly several times.  
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1.1.  Topic and Research Questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the role of capital ships within U.S. naval strategy 
since the end of the Cold War. The thesis will explore how this role developed over this 
period and will discuss the future role of the aircraft carrier as the U.S. capital ship.  
 
Most discussions involving capital ships often revolve around the question of what the capital 
ship is? Is it the ballistic missile submarine or is perhaps some new technological feature that 
has now made the aircraft carrier’s status as capital ship obsolete? These questions will be 
addressed in the thesis, but it is a general assumption that the aircraft carrier is the capital ship 
of the U.S. Navy.  
 
The research question is as follows: 
 
• What is the role of the capital ship within U.S. naval strategy? 
 
The secondary research questions are: 
• What are the characteristics of the capital ship? 
• Has the role of the capital ship in U.S. naval strategy changed over time? 
• Is the role of the capital ship in U.S. naval strategy likely to change in the future? 
 
 
Limitations 
The thesis will investigate U.S. naval strategies from 1992 to 2018.  
 
This limitation is partly due to the framework of the thesis, partly because the capital ship pre-
1945 is considered uncontroversial and well covered in literature. The Cold War is also well 
addressed in available literature.  
 
The thesis will furthermore be limited to examining strategies and doctrines from the United 
States. The United States Navy (USN) is a rank one navy2, and is currently the only rank navy 
in the world.  
                                                
2 Rank 1 – Global reach power projection 
Rank 2 – Limited global-reach power projection 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
4 
For comparison The Royal Navy (RN) second ranked and the Russian Navy (RFN) is a 3rd 
ranked navy (Till, 2018, p. 148). This is obtained by using the Lindberg-Todd classification 
system, where navies are divided in bluewater and non-bluewater navies. A navy’s size of 
ships and its power projection capabilities are the decisive factors when determining its rank. 
This thesis will only focus on the U.S. Navy although there are other relevant navies to 
discuss as well. 
The Royal Navy is of particular relevance because they have accepted a period without 
carriers. 
 
Strategic or nuclear deterrence and its assigned forces will be considered a part of a nation’s 
grand strategy and not a part of naval strategy as such. The ballistic missile submarine 
(SSBN) will therefore not be considered as part of the equation when discussing the role of 
the capital ship in naval strategy.  
 
The empirical data will be limited to official naval strategies and strategic documents from the 
U.S. Navy or the U.S. Government.  
 
Theories within the research areas of seapower theory and naval strategy will be used to 
develop a research framework. 
 
 
1.2. Disposition  
The study consists of an introduction, three parts and a conclusion. Part I sets the analytical 
framework and begins with chapter two, which covers the research methodology. Chapter 
three describes the theoretical framework used in the study; naval strategy and underlying 
missions.  
 
Part II sets the context for the study and will include two parts. Part one uses a historical 
approach to discuss and identify characteristics of the capital ship. Identifying these is one of 
the secondary research questions and a necessary step toward answering the main research 
question. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Rank 3 – Multi-regional power projection. 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
5 
The second part will place these characteristics in relation to the theoretical framework – 
naval strategy.  
 
Part III is the main part of the study and will analyse the empirical data, U.S. naval strategy, 
with the purpose of identifying the capital ship’s role. This will answer the main research 
question, and it consists of three chapters. Chapter five discusses the capital ships role within 
naval strategies in a unipolar world (1992-2001). Chapter six discusses its role in a 
collaborative world (2002-2014). Chapter seven addresses the capital ship in a competitive 
world (2014 and beyond). Additionally, chapter seven includes a section that addresses the 
future of the supercarrier as the capital ship in U.S. naval strategy.  
Each chapter includes a summary, which lists the key findings of each chapter.  
Chapter eight is the final chapter of part III and is a comparative discussion of the capital 
ship’s role in U.S. naval strategy since 1992. The three periods are compared and contrasted 
and the chapter serves as a transition to chapter nine, which offers conclusions and 
suggestions for further research.  
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 Part I – Design and Analytical Framework 
 
2. Research Methodology and Sources 
This chapter describes the research methodology and sources used to answer the research 
questions.  
 
The study’s primary focus is identifying the role of the capital ship in U.S. naval strategy 
since the end of the Cold War through a qualitative approach. Official U.S. documents are the 
focal point of the study.  
The thesis is mainly a case study, where the role of capital ships is analysed in U.S. Naval 
strategy. Theories of seapower and naval strategy are therefore used as the study’s theoretical 
framework.  
 
Since there exists no definite definition of what a capital ship is, it is necessary to conduct an 
extensive literature review and explore how the term is used within naval thinking. This is the 
purpose of the first part of chapter three where the term is discussed and a definition is laid 
out. The second part of chapter three explains basic naval strategy, which provides the 
theoretic framework for the analysis in part III.   
 
It is, however, also necessary to analyse the term within naval history and identify capital ship 
commonalities. This is done using a comparative historic approach, which develops a set of 
characteristics that characterises the capital ship. Using a historic approach to identify capital 
ship characteristics may lead to the danger of constructing an analytical framework based on 
what the capital ships was rather than what it is in modern times. Two steps are taken in order 
to counter this inadequateness. The first is in the literature review in chapter three where new 
trends within capital ship thinking are included. The second step is in chapter seven, which 
includes a section discussing the future of the supercarrier in U.S. naval strategy, the 
methodology of that section is free from the hallmarks that form the foundation of the 
preceding chapters.  
 
The study uses naval strategic and seapower theory as a framework. It is however not the 
purpose to validate theory. There is a lot of academic research available on U.S. naval 
strategy since the Cold War and correspondingly a significant amount of literature of capital 
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ships and their use in the past available. Additionally, there are many articles and books 
available that argue for an alternative to the carrier based fleet structure in the U.S. Navy. This 
study does not try to argue against this fact, nor is it proposing an alternative. It is explorative 
in that it analyses the role of capital ships within U.S. naval strategy, and how this has 
developed over a period of time. There exists no work, which explores the role of the capital 
ship role in modern naval strategy – this thesis will contribute to filling that gap in the case of 
the United States. 
The structure of the study is visualised in the figure below.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Structure. 
 
The actual case studies in step five are divided into four chapters. The first three chapters (5-
7) analyse the role of the capital ship in U.S. naval strategy. Theses chapters are divided in 
time as illustrated below: 
• Chapter 5, Capital Influence in a Unipolar World (1992-2001) 
• Chapter 6, Capital Influence in a Collaborative World (2002-2014) 
• Chapter 7, Capital Influence in a Competitive World (2014-) 
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The chapters use the same methodology; they all have sections on fleet structure that 
describes the structural and technologic circumstances of the period in question. The capital 
ship’s place within fleet structure is, also discussed.  
Each chapter has a diplomatic and a military section that analyses the capital ship’s role 
within the diplomatic and military roles as described in naval strategy.  
Chapter seven also has a section that discusses the future of the supercarrier in U.S. naval 
strategy. All chapters conclude with a summary that lists the key findings.  
 
Chapter eight compares and contrasts the findings of the analysis, using the same structure 
and serves as a lead in to the conclusions in chapter nine. In addition to this, chapter nine 
offers some interesting areas for further research.  
 
Empirical Data 
The selection of sources was purposeful, and the study combines primary and secondary 
sources. The primary sources are official U.S. Government documents and publications by 
U.S. officials, e.g. the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The U.S. do not publish naval 
strategies at pre-determined intervals, in order to determine what is U.S. naval strategy it has 
therefore been necessary to include articles or similar publications from government 
officials3. Secondary sources consist of scholarly articles and books.   
The United States has the National Security Strategy and National Strategy for Maritime 
security published by the President. The National Defence strategy is published by the 
Secretary of Defence and the National Military Strategy is published by the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (USN, 2010, p. 95). These strategies are not used directly since all 
underlying documents are published according to guidelines of higher strategy. 
The U.S. Navy has not published many named strategies, but there are many documents 
published in the form of articles or concepts that describe how the Navy sees seapower being 
used in order to achieve the ends set forward by higher authorities.  
                                                
3 Government officials are individuals from the U.S. military or the executive branch. A white paper 
published by former senator and chairman of the Senate’s armed forces committee, John McCain is 
therefore not considered U.S. naval strategy, or a primary source as such.   
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The Quadrennial Defence Review4 (QDR) is a document published by the Department of 
Defence every four years, it describes and assesses the strategic situation and provide 
guidance to the Armed Forces. 
 
The QDR and data from the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) yearly journal of 
the World’s military balance will be basis for the sections on fleet structure. 
The IISS data provide information about how the navies were actually composed in the 
chosen period. This will provide valuable input to the capital ship’s role within fleet structure 
and it will provide background information for the discussions in the diplomatic and military 
sections. The strategic guidance and decisions on procurement from the QDR provides 
valuable information on what direction the Navy was headed at the time.   
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
4 The Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) was a Department of Defence study conducted every four 
years from 1996-2018. It analysed strategic objectives and military threats. 
The first QDR was issued in 1996; five have been issued in total. Today the National Defence Strategy 
has replaced the report (Gould, 2016).  
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3. Theory 
This chapter constitutes the analytical framework for the thesis by first conducting an 
extensive literature review of where and how the capital ship has been used in historic and 
contemporary literature on seapower. The different elements will be discussed and a 
conclusion will offer a definition of what a capital ship is. A section with terms and 
definitions follows the review. The final part of the chapter is a presentation of naval strategy 
and missions. This forms the basis for part II where the capital ship is placed within generic 
naval strategy and part III that analyses its role in U.S. naval strategy.    
 
3.1. Literature Review – What is said about the Capital Ship  
As mentioned above, there is no common definition of the capital ship. In the past, however, 
most agree that is was the ship of the line, the battleship and eventually, during the Second 
World War the aircraft carrier. In contemporary literature there are some that argue that the 
SSBN has taken the place or that capital ship thinking is no longer relevant.  
 
Despite the ambiguity over the definition of the term capital ship, a number of commonalities 
can be found in the literature. The first commonality to be explored is what I call “Big ships 
and power politics” – it will review some of the thinkers that argue in favour of big ships and 
their relation to diplomacy. The next is simply called “submarines” and will address some of 
the arguments in favour of the SSBN as the capital ship. The last commonality to be explored 
is “The case for reform” – this section will cover some alternative, and contemporary, views 
of the capital ship. The so-called commonalities are not formally recognized but simply a 
loose thematic classification of the different approaches to capital ship thinking. 
 
Definitions of the Capital Ship 
Before I address the three commonalities, I will provide a historic overview of how the term 
has developed throughout history, and when it first appeared.  
In his book Battle at Sea, the renowned British military historian John Keegan offers the 
following definition on the capital ship: “term first coined in 1909 denoting the largest 
fighting ships in the fleet  -battleships and battlecruisers; now obsolete” (Keegan, 2004, p. 
276).  
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Keegan does not suggest what this definition is based on, who actually coined the term in 
1909 nor why the term is now obsolete. But his definition does betray the difficulty in 
explicitly defining the term.  
 
In the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, the term was formally used in an international and 
legally binding context. It defined a capital ship as a ship of war, not an aircraft carrier, whose 
displacement exceeds 10.160 tons or which carries a gun exceeding 8 inches. The treaty 
furthermore placed restrictions on the participating nations, that a capital ship was not allowed 
to exceed a displacement 35.560 tons or carry guns with calibre exceeding 16 inches. Both 
definitions focus on size and firepower to characterize the capital ship, attributes that may not 
be valid today.   
 
According to Dr. Tim Benbow, the role of the capital ships in naval strategy before the 20th 
century was relatively simple. They were the fighting heart of the navy with the mission of 
countering the enemy’s big ships, through engagement or blockade. 
This was necessary in order to secure the ability to use the sea for one’s use and prevent the 
enemy from using it (Benbow, 2016a, pp. 169-171). 
Capital ships are thus a means to a broader objective, which is to use the sea for whatever 
national strategy might require.  
 
Benbow offers a summarized description of the capital ships:  
“However, their key purpose is much the same today as it was in Nelson’s time and in the two 
world wars: they ensure conditions that permit other naval (and, indeed, land and air) forces to 
perform their respective roles. Capital ships secure the use of the sea, other forces exploit it” 
(Benbow, 2016b, p. 4). 
 
This definition suggests that capital ships were, and are, the great enabler for all forces in 
operations where the sea is a factor.  
Benbow does not explicitly mention size and firepower as a prerequisite for capital ships. It 
can be argued however, that these are results of certain technological developments and the 
fact that he does not mention these characteristics makes his description durable and able to 
comprehend alternative views such the network as the capital ship of the future.  
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The Falklands War, however, can be used to challenge Benbow’s description, which contains 
two different missions, one is to secure the sea, and the second is to shape the operational 
theatre. 
Actively securing the use of the sea has not been required on a large scale since World War 2. 
In the case of the Falklands War, it can be argued, that it was the submarine HMS Conqueror 
through sinking the Argentine cruiser, the ARA Belgrano that secured the use of the sea. This 
fact should, however, be seen as the result of tactical dispositions during that particular time 
of the war. The British carriers were actively engaged in countering the Argentine carrier, the 
latter was however not able to launch its aircraft due to lack of wind. The British submarine 
shadowed the Argentine cruiser, and it was eventually considered a threat to the British Task 
Force. The Belgrano was a former American World War 2 cruiser, it was heavily armoured 
and the British assessed that it could only be neutralized by torpedoes or the 1000-pound 
bombs, carried by the Sea Harriers. Admiral Woodward decided to use the former, since the 
submarine was already within engagement range (Brown, 1989, pp. 133-134). 
The carriers, furthermore, with their airpower ensured conditions, in this case a favourable air 
situation, that allowed the amphibious landing to take place and the subsequent war on land to 
succeed. The Falkland example illustrates, that with modern naval combat technology, tactical 
considerations can lead to tasks being solved differently. 
 
Another scholar, Geoffrey Till describes capital ships as “the most important ships of their 
time. They are expensive, individually powerful and immensely prestigious” (Till, 2018, p. 
154). This description does not say anything about their role, although prestige may be seen in 
relation to their role in naval diplomacy.  
 
In an article Steve Wills suggests that changes to capital ship concepts stems from a 
combination of new technology, changes in the strategic situation and changes in the financial 
resources available for warship construction. Wills uses several examples from history to 
support his case. In his conclusion, he argues that any future capital ship that succeeds the 
current, must at least deliver a heavier sustained combat punch and greater ordnance over time 
(Wills, 2017, pp. 1-11).  
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
13 
Big ships and power politics 
This section will deal with  “Big ship and power politics” within capital ship thinking.  
The prevailing idea is that size and firepower are key features of capital ships and this can be 
used politically. Additionally the big ships were needed to secure sea control in times of 
hostilities. Sea control was the great enabler within naval strategy, it was what nations needed 
to secure in order to do other things. A method of obtaining it was by engaging the enemy’s 
fleet. This required big ships and massive firepower. There is therefore a distinct connection 
between the big ship, sea control and the capital ship designation.   
 
The American naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) is mostly known for his 
thoughts on seapower, a term he coined, although he never actually defined it. 
In Mahan’s view, the primary mission for a navy was to win the struggle for sea control. 
Although he does not use the term itself, the literature suggests that Mahan sees the battleship 
as the capital ship (Till, 2018, pp. 73-74). 
 
Mahan published a lot during his lifetime and although he never used the term capital ship 
some of his work dealt with fleet structure and how he saw the employment of ships and 
fleets. In 1899, Mahan published an article called Distinguishing qualities of ships of war. In 
this article, Mahan argues in favour of the battleship, or the armoured fleet. He writes that the 
armoured fleet is the most interesting part of the fleet, and the part that should receive most 
attention (Mahan, 1899, p. 273). He distinguishes between the armoured ships like the 
battleship and the ships without armour like the cruiser.  
 
He refers to the armoured cruiser as a 2nd class battleship (Mahan, 1899, p. 271). In his view, 
the term, armoured cruiser is a contradiction in terms because a cruiser needs to be fast and 
perform various supporting functions, which becomes a challenge if it is armoured and thus 
very heavy. His main argument is that if a navy wants to have decisive effect on the maritime 
war it must be composed of heavy ships possessing the fullest extent of fighting power 
(Mahan, 1899, p. 265).  
 
A Mahanian capital ship was thus a ship that, as part of a larger fleet of capital ships, would 
win the battle for sea control. With sea control secured, one’s own commerce can move freely 
and the fleet can begin destroying the enemy’s commerce.  
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The objective of naval strategy is thus sea control initially and ultimately secure sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs). Therefore, for Mahan, the capital ship served as a means to 
securing sea control (or command of the sea as he called it) through the destruction of the 
enemy’s fleet5.  
 
Another of the classic naval strategists, the Briton Sir Julian Stafford Corbett (1854-1922) too 
offered some views of fleet structure and ship employment. In Corbett’s view: “The object of 
naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or 
to prevent the enemy from securing it” (Corbett, 1911, p. 54). According to Corbett securing 
that control was a task for the battle fleet (a fleet composed of battleships), and the primary 
mean to secure this control would be to defeat the enemy’s battle fleet. Exercising this control 
was also important to Corbett, this was a job for the cruiser which led him to argue, that the 
true function of the battle fleet was the protection of the cruisers and flotillas – preferably 
through destroying the enemy’s power of interference (Corbett, 1911, pp. 72-74).  
Corbett, like Mahan, was a proponent of the biggest and most powerful ship, the battleship, as 
the capital ship. It was this type of ship, which was able to secure the ultimate object of naval 
warfare – sea control.  
 
Joseph Moretz offers a very comprehensive overview of the British discussions on fleet 
structure in the interwar period. The British considered their battleships and battlecruisers as 
their capital ships and this was used to measure relative strength to other navies (Moretz, 
2014, pp. 32-65). The British used capital ships specifically as a mean of diplomacy, both as a 
deterrence and assurance measure.  
 
As a preface to Moretz’ book, the series editor, Geoffrey Till, writes:  
“The point is that the battleship needs to be put into context, to be seen more as the most 
important part of a balanced battlefleet, and less as a weapon system in its own right, than has 
often been the case in previous analyses” (Moretz, 2014, p. vii). 
 
Till’s point supports the views of Mahan and Corbett. Both are proponents of the battleship, 
and Mahan has in particular been lamented with a one sided focus on the big ships. Both of 
                                                
5 Mahan did did not spend much effort on discussing how a relatively weaker navy should operate (Cable, 1998, 
p. 44).   
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them, however, argued in favour of a balanced fleet. Moretz demonstrates how capital ships 
had a place as an instrument of diplomacy as well. In his book Seapower, Till refers to the 
Lindberg-Todd classification system of navies. According to this system, the highest ranked 
navies are those with the greatest reach within power projection (Till, 2018, p. 148). This 
suggests, that it is the size of a navy’s ships and the ability to support them far from home that 
determines how high it is ranked. 
 
In essence this trend can be summed up with “size matters”, capital ships are inherently 
connected with relative size, firepower and being a visible tool for diplomacy. Ships of the 
line, battleships and aircraft carriers all fit into this line of thinking.  
 
Submarines 
Another side to the “capital ship argument” is the case of the submarine as the capital ship. 
Today it is often discussed whether the capital ship is the aircraft carrier or the submarine. 
This segment will present some of the views in favour of the submarine. This thesis does not 
take a side in this debate, although a remark from Benbow is worth mentioning; “that in order 
to secure control of the sea a navy needs surface warships” (Benbow, 2008, pp. 222-223). It 
can be argued that submarines can not exploit sea control, but they should be able to create it. 
 
In 1986, Gary Hart and William S. Lind argue that the submarine is today’s capital ship. They 
define the capital ship in the following manner: “if the capital ships are beaten, the rest of the 
navy is beaten. But if the rest of the navy is beaten, the capital ships can still operate”. They 
continue and argue that another characteristic that defines the capital ships is that their main 
opponent is each other, which appears to be true of submarines of today. They recognize that 
this position is not tested in actual combat since wartime engagements between submarines 
are somewhat limited. But, the U.S. submarine fleet (except for the SSBNs) is built on this 
notion (Hart & Lind, 1986, p. 90). 
The book’s main author, Gary Hart, was a U.S. senator and co-founder of the Military Reform 
Caucus at the time of its publication in 1986. Hart wanted to reform the US military and the 
book should be seen in this light.   
 
A Soviet approach to the subject comes from the former commander of the Soviet Navy, 
Admiral Gorshkov (1910-1988). In 1979, he published The Seapower of the State; in this he 
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discusses the purpose of fleet vs. fleet and fleet vs. shore engagements. In his opinion, the 
advent of missiles and nuclear weapons have led to the fact that naval forces are now capable 
of strategic strikes – in the past, battleships only engaged at the tactical level of war 
(Gorshkov, 1979, p. 224). The outcome of these engagements could of course have strategic 
consequences.  Gorshkov further states that the struggle for dominance at sea has become 
even tougher in the nuclear and missile age, and the timeframe in which one can expect to 
have control has become equally shorter. He consequently concludes: “that submarines has 
become the main branch of the forces of modern fleets” (Gorshkov, 1979, p. 233). However, 
when addressing local wars of imperialism, he concludes that the aircraft carriers ability to 
strike at targets at great distances have led these ships to be the most important forces in a 
local war (Gorshkov, 1979, p. 236).   
 
In the 1974 Naval War College review, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner (1923-2018) presents 
a detailed view of missions of the U.S. Navy. Turner refers to four mission areas established 
by the CNO; strategic deterrence, sea control, naval presence and projection of power ashore 
(Turner, 1974, p. 2). According to Turner there is very little overlap between strategic 
deterrence and the other (traditional) naval missions. The strategic deterrence missions are 
carried out by the SSBN, which operate independently from the rest of the navy. Furthermore, 
the SSBNs are almost exclusively operating within this mission area (Turner, 1974, p. 5). 
Turner clearly distinguishes between strategic deterrence forces and general purpose forces 
(Turner, 1974, p. 15). This supports the decision of not considering the SSBN as a capital ship 
and therefore its place within naval strategy will not be discussed.   
 
The case for an alternative approach 
In the preceding sections, two different views on capital ships have been presented. This 
paragraph will present three additional. Some of these views go further than suggesting a 
specific hull or type of ship as the capital ship. These views are relevant because they 
contribute to the discussion of the role of capital ships and indeed navies. 
 
In an article, Professor Robert Rubel describes the capital ship as the ship capable of defeating 
all others. In agreement with some of the other authors mentioned above, he argues that the 
capital ship historically was the biggest and most expensive ship in the fleet. The ship that 
held the biggest guns or carried the most aircrafts. It was the least numerous type of ship in a 
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navy and a measurement of relative strength between navies. With this ship, a nation could 
contend for command of the sea, globally or regionally. If a nation’s maritime commerce 
where a risk, the capital ship would be deployed (Rubel, 2017, pp. 1-2).  
 
Rubel states, that the limited number of capital ships in a navy would often mean, that leaders 
would be wary about risking them in combat, since losses could mean shifts in the relative 
balance of power. Rubel declares that in the contemporary age, the missile is the most 
dominant and decisive weapon at sea, and that many nations now have advanced surface to air 
missile systems. These facts are challenging the aircraft carriers status as capital ship. 
Furthermore, he suggests, that if the missile are now the key weapon, carriers of missiles 
could therefore be considered capital ships (Rubel, 2017, pp. 4-5). 
Ultimately, Rubel argues that one should look beyond the hull and start considering the 
network as the future equivalent to the capital ship. Rubel imagines a large network of 
sensors, processing decision-making being the pivot of fleet design (Rubel, 2017, pp. 6-7).  
 
In another article, Harry Bennett argues in a somewhat similar fashion. He proposes the 
Mission Command Vessel (MCV) as the capital ship of 2035. According to Bennett, the 
MCV would be the centrepiece in a larger network, the gathering point of all information 
from various unmanned vehicles and other sensors. (Bennett, 2017, pp. 1-5). 
One can suggest that the MCV might be the physical materialisation of Rubel’s network 
suggestion.  
 
Retired Navy captain Pete Pagano takes an entirely different standpoint. In his opinion, a 21st 
century capital ship must still be a hull in the water able to conduct combat operations.  
He refers to U.S. Navy doctrine that highlights the importance of sea control as a prerequisite 
for all other naval operations. Sea control operations are, but not limited to, destroying the 
enemy’s naval forces, supress his sea commerce, protect vital SLOCs and establish local 
military superiority. Pagano suggests a revival of the sea control ship, a concept contemplated 
in the seventies by then CNO Admiral Zumwalt. The concept featured smaller aircraft carriers 
to supplement the large carrier strike groups.  
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Pagano suggests using the Wasp or America class to test the concept today6. He argues, that in 
a high intensity conflict, a supercarrier will be preoccupied with strike oriented power 
projection or seeing to its own defence. A smaller carrier, the sea control ship, could therefore 
fulfil the supporting mission of establishing and maintaining sea control around the 
supercarrier (Pagano, 2017, pp. 1-10).   
 
Summary 
This literature review has offered an overview on how some scholars, practitioners and even 
one politician view the capital ship and its role. As mentioned, there exists no conclusive 
definition on the subject. However, the two descriptions from Till and Benbow describes the 
ship and the function well. They are both born from the original capital ship thinking, which 
was relatively uncontroversial up until the advent of airpower. The role of navies and capital 
ships was at least not questioned in the same way that it was after airpower entered the scene. 
 
Different strategic circumstances, context, strategy and more may all lead to differences in 
opinion about what constitutes the capital ship. In a search for a definition, I will however 
look to Benbow and Till.  
 
The capital ship definition used in this thesis will be; They are the most important ships of 
their time, they ensure conditions that permit other forces or functions to perform their 
respective role. In wartime, capital ships secure the use of the sea.  
 
This definition is derived from the descriptions offered by Till and Benbow. It includes the 
importance of their time factor from Till which can be interpreted in different ways in 
different navies and in different strategic circumstances. The segment from Benbow’s 
description is used to include capital ships in a joint context, in peace through crisis and war. 
The part about securing the sea, is the classic capital ship function.  
 
 
 
                                                
6 According to Pagano, this smaller carrier should not be fitted with catapults and arresting gear. The air wing 
should therefor consist of F-35B, MV-22 Osprey and Seahawk helicopters – all capable of vertical take-off and 
landing (VTOL). In the seventies the concept was tested and abandoned because the Harrier aircraft at the time 
did not have the required capabilities. 
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3.2. Terms and definitions  
Capital ship: They are the most important ships of their time, they ensure conditions that 
permit other forces or functions to perform their respective role. In wartime, capital ships 
secure the use of the sea. 
 
Gunboat diplomacy: “the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of 
war, in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international 
dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own 
state” (Cable, 1994, p. 14).  
 
Maritime strategy: Maritime strategy is the plan for how a nation exercises its non-military 
power at sea in order to meet the ends of a larger strategy. 
 
Naval diplomacy: The use of naval forces in support of diplomacy to support, persuade or 
coerce (Till, 2018, p. 48) 
 
Naval strategy: Naval strategy is the plan for how a nation exercises its military power at sea 
in order to meet the ends of a larger strategy. 
 
Power projection: A nation’s capability to exert influence in peacetime and to secure and 
exercise sea control in a time of hostilities (Vego, 2016, pp. 24-25).  
 
Sea control: An offensive objective, which refers to the ability to use a given part of a body 
of water and its associated air space for military and non-military purposes in a time of open 
hostilities. In a war at sea between two strong opponents, it is not possible, except in the most 
limited sense, to completely control the seas for one’s use of to completely deny an 
opponent’s use. (Vego, 2013, pp. 1-2).  
 
Sea denial: A defensive objective at the strategic level and is the principal objective of the 
weaker side. It aims to deny in part of full an adversary’s use of the sea for military and 
commercial purposes. The weaker side, however, may transition to the offensive at the 
operational and tactical levels (Vego, 2013, p. 2).  
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Seapower: is comprised of maritime capabilities both military and civilian, naval operations 
and commercial operations (Till, 2018, pp. 24-25) 
 
Strategy: The link between military means and political ends. (Bekkevold, Bowers, & Raska, 
2015, p. 7). 
 
Supercarrier: U.S. nuclear powered aircraft carrier. (Today the Nimitz- and Ford-class 
aircraft carriers) 
 
Surface combatants: are major surface warships that are not capital ships. In the U.S. Navy 
these are mainly the cruisers and destroyers.  
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3.3. Naval Strategy 
This chapter serves as the thesis’ theoretical framework on naval strategy. It consists of two 
main sections. The first section explains naval strategy, what missions navies have. When 
placed in context with the literature review and capital ship definition above it will set the 
scene for analysing and identifying capital ship characteristics in the next part as well placing 
these within the context of naval strategy.  
 
This section will explain the theoretic side of naval strategy in detail. However, one must first 
be able to place naval strategy among the other strategies a nation will have.    
Defining strategy however, is like defining the capital ship, not a simple task. There are no 
exact definitions of strategy nor is there one literary work that covers all approaches to the 
subject.  
 
Beatrice Heuser sees strategy as the link between political aims and the use of force or its 
threats. This broad definition is typical in the field of security studies (Heuser, 2010, p. 3).  
 
Bekkevold, Bowers and Raska describe grand strategy as “the highest level of direction in 
which military power and strategy is linked with political, economic, demographic and other 
national resources to form a coherent direction for the employment of state power”. Strategy 
is simply defined as “the link between military means and political ends” (Bekkevold et al., 
2015, p. 7). 
The overall concept can thus be expressed very simple through the definition offered by 
Bekkevold, Bowers and Raska, and grand strategy is the overarching strategy to which all 
other strategies are subjected.  
 
Maritime strategy is “the science and art of using both naval and non-naval sources of power 
at sea” whereas naval strategy is “the science and art of using all naval sources of power in 
support of the national military strategy” (Vego, 2016, p. 3). 
 
Naval strategy is therefore the military part of the maritime strategy, which in turn is a part of 
a nation’s grand strategy. Naval strategy is however also a part of the nation’s military 
strategy, which of course also is subject to the grand strategy.  
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Seapower7 is a very wide term for the capabilities that can be fed into a naval or maritime 
strategy.  
 
It is worth noting, that there are some nuances to this break down into different strategies. Not 
all researchers and commentators make the same distinction between naval and maritime 
strategy and the terms are used rather inconsistently.  
 
Naval strategy is about how a country applies its navy to meet its ends or how the country 
chooses to exercise its power at sea. The definition used in this thesis will be: Naval strategy 
is the plan for how a nation exercises its military power at sea in order to meet the ends of a 
larger strategy8. In other words, naval strategy is about how a nation uses the military part of 
its seapower. 
 
Different Naval Strategies 
The Danish naval historian, H.C. Bjerg distinguishes between three different schools within 
seapower9. The offensive (global), the defensive (continental) and the negative schools. 
According to Bjerg, all thoughts and theories on seapower falls within one of these schools 
(Bjerg, 2016, p. 167).  
 
The negative school believes that seapower does not have any significant influence on world 
affairs. Notable proponents of this line of thinking were Mackinder with his theory of Euraisa 
as the “world island” or the Italian officer Douhet, who was a strong proponent of airpower 
(Bjerg, 2016, p. 167).  
 
The offensive school argues the opposite, that seapower has indeed influenced history and 
world affairs. Two known thinkers within this line of thinking are Mahan and the Corbett. 
The defensive school was in many ways born out of necessity. France had long tried to match 
                                                
7 Seapower is a commonly used term. It is an instrument of state policy containing activities, expertise and 
weapons (Gray, 1992, p. 3). More specifically it can be expressed as a state’s maritime capabilities both military 
and civilian (Till, 2018, pp. 24-25). Seapower is therefore not limited to military capabilities, but it also includes 
a nation’s merchant fleet and its expertise within this area.  
8 Maritime strategy is thus defined as the plan for how a nation uses its non-military power at sea in order to 
meet the ends of a larger strategy.  
9 Bjerg’s understanding of seapower is in conjunction with the one offered in this study. The three schools have 
different views on how to use seapower. The primary focus of this thesis is the military part of seapower in the 
offensive school.    
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the Royal Navy’s big ships on the world’s oceans but after her catastrophic defeat to Prussia 
in 1871, France turned much of her resources to land warfare instead. This led to a new line of 
thinking, at first made to fit French circumstances at the time but later adopted outside of 
France. The defensive school argued, that a nation should not try to secure sea control (as 
opposed to the offensive school), instead one should take advantage of the new self-propelled 
torpedo and fit it to smaller, and faster warships, which should then serve as a sort of anti-
invasion force. This focus on smaller ships rather than the expensive big ships is also referred 
to as la jeune ecole. Furthermore, one should have fast cruisers operating on the open seas 
attacking the enemy’s commerce – this was also known as the guerre de course (Bjerg, 2016, 
pp. 164-165).  
 
Mahan’s most famous work, The Influence of Seapower upon History 1660-1783 does not 
engage with the concept of la jeune ecole. His work was an advocacy for the operation of big 
ships and the necessity of sea control. It was studied all over the world and it was hugely 
influential in countries like Germany, Japan and the United States in the early 20th century.  
His work was a study of the history of the British Empire, from which he drew his 
conclusions. His thoughts do not constitute actual theory but were, as mentioned, influential 
in their own right. Another thinker of the offensive school, Corbett, did put an effort into 
connecting naval strategy into a larger framework.  
 
According to Corbett the object of naval war is to directly or indirectly secure control of the 
sea, or prevent the enemy from securing it. Control of the sea is important because it gives a 
nation the ability to use the sea for whatever purpose it might have, transport an invading 
army or simply the transportation of goods (Corbett, 1911, pp. 54-56). In order to do this you 
must have the appropriate degree of sea control, and thus make sure that the enemy is not able 
to interfere.  
 
Corbett sees the destruction of the enemy’s fleet as sensible; however, if opportunities to 
attack his commerce arises they should have priority as well (Corbett, 1911, p. 63).  
According to Corbett, control of the sea is not absolute; it should be regarded in relative terms 
e.g. time and space (Corbett, 1911, pp. 54-68).  
The battleships are able to defeat the enemy in an actual fleet vs. fleet action. However, this is 
not always possible since the enemy’s fleet might be trying to avoid direct confrontation. The 
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real object, Corbett argues, is to be able to use the sea according to national strategies, and not 
necessarily the destruction of the enemy’s battle fleet, (Corbett, 1911, pp. 72-77).  
 
3.3.1. Missions 
This section will explore what navies actually do at sea or in other words – their missions. 
There are many ways to describe and classify the various missions a navy can have. The basis 
will be Ken Booth’s triangle (The Naval Trinity) that presents the three main roles and the 
subsequent missions that navies will undertake. The views of Professor Geoffrey Till, U.S. 
Vice admiral Stansfield Turner and Soviet admiral Sergei Gorshkov are also included to 
illustrate how the trinity is an entirely applicable model and a valid framework for this thesis.  
 
Booth argued that nations would use the sea for three different reasons. The first is for the 
passage of goods and people. The second is for the passage of military force for diplomatic 
purposes or for use against targets at sea or ashore and third for the exploitation of resources 
(Booth, 1977, p. 15). 
Booth, like Corbett, sees naval warfare as part of a larger picture. If you are capable of doing 
what you want at sea, transporting commerce, troops or something different, it allows you to 
something else ashore – and that is what is decisive.   
 
In order to achieve a state’s objectives, Booth argues, navies must be able to operate within 
three different roles, diplomatic, military and policing. All naval functions and missions will 
be subordinate to any of these roles (Booth, 1977, pp. 15-16). The three roles are illustrated in 
the form of a trinity. The trinity has been interpreted over time by other thinkers (e.g. Eric 
Grove), some subordinate roles and missions have been discussed. In 2014 Ian Speller’s book, 
Understanding Naval Warfare, investigated whether this trinity based approach to naval roles 
were still valid. Speller concludes that these roles still apply today. The missions may have 
changed, but the roles and the trinity can still be used to illustrate the functions of today’s 
navies (Speller, 2014, pp. 194-195). The Australian maritime doctrine uses a Booth inspired 
trinity, it is currently the most publically advanced version of this framework and I will 
therefore be using it here. 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
25 
 
 
Figure 2 (RAN, 2010, p. 100) 
 
The sides illustrate the three roles of navies, diplomatic, constabulary and military. Each role 
has a list of subordinate functions or missions. The top of the triangle represents the most 
benign missions the degree of force used increases towards the bottom that represents the 
exclusive military role. Some of the missions will later be discussed and connected to capital 
ship characteristics.  
 
In the following the thoughts of three alternative thinkers will be presented, the purpose is to 
demonstrate the applicability of Booth’s trinity as a framework for analysis. 
Turner mentions the three traditional missions of the U.S. Navy as sea control, naval presence 
and projection of power ashore. Each mission has its subordinate “tactics”. According to 
Turner, some of the possible tactics of sea control could be sortie control (barrier operations) 
or chokepoint control (Turner, 1974, pp. 2-3). The three traditional missions put forward by 
Turner, are all encompassed in Booth’s trinity. The mission of sea control and its subordinate 
tactics can be placed under combat operations at sea. Preventive and reactive deployments are 
mentioned as the two tactics of the naval presence mission (Turner, 1974, p. 14). The 
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diplomatic side of the trinity covers this mission and its tactics. Finally, Turner speaks of 
projection of power ashore, this contains amphibious assault, naval bombardment and the use 
of tactical air operations (Turner, 1974, p. 13). These capabilities are mostly covered by the 
combat operations from the sea.  
 
In his book, Gorshkov also offers some views on which missions a navy can undertake. He 
distinguishes between nuclear war and non-nuclear war (which he calls local wars of 
imperialism). Some of Gorshkov’s most distinctive views on how to use a state’s seapower is 
covered by the trinity. 
He is very focused on a navy’s ability to perform strike operations ashore. He remarks, that 
this capability has given a navy the possibility to directly influence or even decide a war 
(Gorshkov, 1979, p. 221). This view is of course covered by combat operations from the sea. 
Gorshkov also mentions that it is “a favourite technique of the imperialists is to apply 
military-political pressure through show of strength by the fleet on democratic governments 
not to their liking” (Gorshkov, 1979, p. 237). The use of fleets as an instrument of diplomacy 
is constantly expanding in peacetime (Gorshkov, 1979, p. 247). These missions fit within the 
diplomatic role.  
 
Neither Turner nor Gorshkov consider navies in a constabulary role. Both men published their 
work at the height of the Cold War, where the diplomatic and military side of the triangle 
were most relevant. Although Booth’s original publication of the trinity was from the Cold 
War as well. In Booth’s version, that side is not named constabulary but policing and the 
subordinate missions are coastguard responsibilities and nation building (Booth, 1977, p. 9). 
For both men, coastguard missions were not relevant to discuss since both the United States 
and the Soviet Union had separate coastguards and nation building was perhaps not that 
interesting to discuss in relation to naval strategy at the time.  
 
Following the Cold War, Till distinguished between a modern and a post-modern navy10. 
Some of the modern navy’s missions are sea control, nuclear deterrence, maritime power 
                                                
10 According to Till globalisation has created a new paradigm in the international system. A paradigm 
in which nations and their navies should be focused on collaborative rather than competitive action 
(Till, 2018, pp. 36-37). Consequently, he distinguishes between a modern and a post-modern navy. These are 
navies from nations with a realistic and liberal view on the international system respectively. Till acknowledges 
that a navy is not entirely modern or post-modern, but there will probably be elements of both within a navy. In 
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projection and gunboat diplomacy. Whereas some of the post-modern missions are sea 
control, expeditionary, stability and humanitarian operations, ensuring good order at sea and 
finally collaborative diplomacy. (Till, 2018, pp. 46-49).  
 
Collaborative as well as competitive naval diplomacy can be covered through the diplomatic 
role and through missions such as assistance to allied and friendly nations, presence and 
preventive diplomacy and coercion. Till’s approach also demonstrates how missions can 
change over time, in this case depending on the global strategic context. As mentioned, naval 
strategy and thus naval missions are subordinate to other strategies, which are affected by this 
development. One must therefore consider world events when discussing changes in 
strategies, missions and fleet structure.  
 
As demonstrated, the Australian trinity is capable of encompassing a wide variety of views 
toward the roles and missions that navies can undertake. The model will therefore form the 
basis for further discussion in part II where the capital ships’ place within a navy’s roles and 
missions will be discussed further. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                   
the current world of great power competition this distinction is probably not that fitting, but they are included 
here to demonstrate a variety in naval missions. 
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 Part II – The Capital Ship in Naval Strategy 
 
4. Characteristics of the Capital Ship 
This section will define some of the characteristics of a capital ship. It will use a comparative 
historical approach, starting with the ship of the line in the age of sail and ending with the 
modern-day supercarrier. 
In the contemporary world the aircraft carrier is considered as today’s capital ship in western 
navies.  
 
These characteristics are first defined then they will be put into context within the diplomatic 
and military role. This establishes the analytical framework that will be used during the work 
with the actual case study.  
 
This paragraph will show that some characteristics are timeless; they can be applied to the 
ship of the line as well as the aircraft carrier.  
Table 1 presents capital ships throughout history beginning with the ship of the line. It lists 
features, vulnerabilities and the certain roles and missions that the respective capital ship 
undertook.  
 
The different ships and their characteristics are discussed below the figure.  
Time Capital Ship Features  Vulnerabilities  Roles  
Diplomatic – D 
Military - M 
1600-
1850 
Ship of the line size, firepower 
(broadside),  
Other ships of the 
line 
 
No armour, 
explosive shells 
Power projection (D), 
engaging the enemy 
fleet in line of battle,  
Blockading enemy 
ports (M) 
1850-
1880 
Ironclads/ships 
of steel 
Armour, steam 
powered, screw 
driven 
Mines, quickly 
obsolete 
Relative balance of 
power (UK-FR) (D) 
1880-
1906 
Pre-
dreadnoughts  
(battleships) 
Armour, steam 
powered, screw 
driven  
Mines, 
submarines, 
required screen of 
escorts, 
Power projection, status 
symbol, relative 
balance of power 
(D)(more global), ship 
to ship combat (M) 
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1906-
1922 
Post-
dreadnoughts 
(WW1 era 
battleships) 
Speed, size, 
armour, 
firepower, 
survivability, 
navies vary of 
risking them in 
battle  
Mines, 
submarines, 
required screen of 
escorts, 
Power projection, status 
symbol (D), countering 
the enemy’s battle fleet 
(M) 
1922-
1941 
WW2 era 
Battleships 
Speed, size, 
armour, 
firepower, 
survivability,  
Airpower, mines, 
submarines, 
required screen of 
escorts, 
Risk of loosing 
them is great  - 
tied to national 
prestige. 
Power projection (D), 
countering the enemy’s 
battle fleet (M), could 
be used for strikes 
ashore (M) 
1941-
1961 
Aircraft carriers Firepower over 
long distances 
through 
airpower  
Airpower, 
missiles, 
submarines 
requires some 
escorts  
Some degree of power 
projection (D), 
delivering airpower 
(M), strikes ashore (M) 
1961- Nuclear 
powered super 
carriers 
(Carrier Battle 
Group/Carrier 
Strike Group) 
Size, strike, 
airpower, navies 
wary of risking 
them, unlimited 
range 
Missiles, littorals, 
submarines, 
requires screen of 
escorts, cyber 
warfare 
Power projection (D), 
extremely flexible, 
symbolic value (D), 
Strike (M)  
1992- Amphibious 
assault ship 
(Amphibious 
Ready Group) 
Symbol of 
increased 
jointness 
Missiles, littorals, 
submarines, 
requires a screen 
of escorts  
Power projection (D), 
amphibious operations 
(M) 
Table 1. Characteristics of the Capital Ship over time. 
 
Table Analysis 
The table demonstrates that some characteristics have remained largely unchanged throughout 
time and others have changed.  
 
The diplomatic role is relatively unchanged. HMS Victory was a ship of war and a very 
visible tool for diplomacy in much the same way that the U.S. Navy’s newest supercarrier the 
USS Gerald R. Ford is today. Both the Victory and the Gerald R. Ford are ships that were and 
are in relative terms immensely powerful. Capital ships’ diplomatic role, it can be argued, 
comes from their latent military power. Capital ships are not just for warfighting, they can be 
used to deter war as well, which is a key reason to why states invest in them in the first place 
(Sondhaus, 2001, pp. 225-228). As Benbow points out “The role of capital ships is often to 
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prevent something unfavourable happening, which makes it easy to overlook their 
importance” (Benbow, 2016b, p. 4).  
 
In the case of the military role, a continuous task throughout is securing sea control.  
An important feature of capital ships of the past was the fact that their main opponents were 
each other, and their primary mission was to secure the sea either by battle or blockade 
(Benbow, 2016b, pp. 1-2).  
The task of securing sea control in the contemporary world has perhaps not been perceived as 
important as in the past as there have been a lack of peer conflict. 
In the age of globalisation, everyone benefits from open SLOCS so who is going to attack it 
and with what purpose? (Till, 2018, pp. 36-37). Nevertheless actively securing sea control 
remains a key naval task in wartime, as it is still a prerequisite for all other operations at sea.   
 
Also within the military role, it seems clear that combat operations from the sea have grown 
increasingly important. If we return to the thoughts of Corbett, influencing events ashore is 
important, naval warfare can influence what happens on land. The Gerald R. Ford can 
certainly influence events ashore far more directly than Victory ever could. This has happened 
simultaneously with the technological development. bigger guns, fire control that is more 
precise, airpower and missiles have made it possible to exert this influence. A ship of the 
line’s maximum weapon range was 8-900 yards (Hughes Jr. & Girrier, 2018, p. 36) compared 
to the 2000 kilometres of a F-18 (Freidman, 2006, p. 565).   
 
Another feature that seems to be more contemporary is the ability to fulfil more missions. As 
mentioned the Victory’s primary task was to counter the enemy’s capital ship and ensure sea 
control.  
During the Second World War, battleships provided fire support to troops on land and an 
aircraft carrier’s air wing can contribute to military operations in various ways. Ensuring a 
favourable air situation over fighting armies ashore is just one example. This was the case in 
the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Falklands War.  
The historical trend is therefore increasing multi-functionality and this is reflected in the 
multiple number of missions a modern supercarrier can undertake. 
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Technological developments have also led to capital ships becoming increasingly vulnerable. 
Today a carrier can be neutralised in various ways, and some nations work actively on 
missiles or systems designed specifically to target carriers.  
China has apparently practiced counter-intervention operations or what the Americans call 
Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD). This is countering an adversary’s capabilities to enter and 
operate in a specific are. One of the weapons is the so called “carrier killer” the DF-21D, a 
land based anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) (Till, 2012, pp. 68-69).  
These threats, however have also led to the development of defensive measures in the form of 
escorts and/or systems. 
 
It seems to be certain, that while the diplomatic role in the trinity has remained largely 
unchanged the military missions have changed as technology allowed engineers to build 
bigger and increasingly more powerful ships capable of delivering bigger punches and further 
inland that Victory ever could. Technology also led to new threats in the form of torpedoes 
and missiles, which in turn led to counter actions.  
 
4.1. The Aircraft Carrier as the Capital Ship in the U.S. Navy 
This section will provide a short overview of how the U.S. Navy was organised and operated 
throughout the period investigated in this study. The supercarrier is considered the U.S. 
capital ship. As will be demonstrated the amphibious assault ship is considered a capital ship 
also, especially during the unipolar period. As great power competition returned there is a 
tendency toward the aircraft carrier occupying the throne alone. 
 
The U.S. Navy surface fleet is designed around their capital ships. The deployed fleet was and 
is composed of a number of groups with a capital ship (an aircraft carrier or an amphibious 
assault ship) in the middle.  
 
These groups are normally known as Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) or Amphibious Ready 
Groups (ARG). In addition to the capital ship in the centre, each group is augmented by 
surface combatants for air defence and ballistic missile defence (BMD) and submarines for 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) (Clark et al., 2017, p. 3).  
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These groups are then assigned to regional commanders, and operate in their respective area 
of responsibility (AOR). Here they will demonstrate naval presence and other operations. The 
U.S. Navy’s role is therefore as force provider to the various regional commanders and its 
force structure is therefore designed around projected demands for naval presence by the 
regional commanders (Clark et al., 2017, p. 43).  
 
4.2. The Capital Ship in Naval Strategy 
In this section capital ship characteristics are placed into context with the diplomatic and 
military role of the naval trinity outlined in part I of this chapter. The result will be the 
methodological framework that will be used to conduct the case study.  
 
The section will show what part capital ships play, or can play, within the different roles and 
missions a Navy is likely to undertake.  
The characteristics need to be seen in close conjunction with the definition of the capital ship 
provided in chapter one. It should be noted that some characteristics are not necessarily 
unique to the capital ship, other ships can be used in diplomatic roles as well but their impact 
is not as overwhelming. An American destroyer moored in a Norwegian city is of course a 
form of presence, it can reassure an ally and it can send a signal to Russia. After all, a U.S. 
destroyer is usually armed with long-range Tomahawk missiles. But its visit is dwarfed by the 
presence of an American aircraft carrier in a Norwegian fjord11.  
The capital ship therefore fulfils the definition and most of the characteristics identified, and 
they do it better than any other ship. 
 
I will not focus on the capital ship in relation to constabulary missions. This is not to say that 
capital ships do not have a constabulary role to play. In fact, British capital ships undertook 
several constabulary missions in the interwar period, some were in fact deployed when Britain 
experienced internal unrest such as protesting workers or Scottish nationalists. (Moretz, 2014, 
pp. 199-202). This was however not their missions according to naval strategy at the time, and 
as demonstrated in the previous paragraph it is not a significant role for these ships. 
 
 
                                                
11 The aircraft carrier USS America sailed through Vestfjorden in northern Norway in 1985 as part of a NATO 
exercise. Pictures of this are still being used in Norway this day.  
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Diplomatic 
The diplomatic capacity of the capital ship is ultimately derived from its latent power 
projection capability. Power Projection12 can take many forms, and become ever more 
aggressive as nation decides to travel up the “degree of force employed scale”, or in this case, 
the degree of force threatened to be employed. This is illustrated below: 
 
o Presence 
o Preventive diplomacy 
o Coercion 
 
The degree of force employed increases as the operation moves from benign to more coercive. 
 
From the trinity I choose to focus on the missions presence, preventive diplomacy and 
coercion as they represent three missions in chronological order as the nation employs a 
higher degree of force.  
 
Below the three missions are described and discussed in relation to the capital ship. 
 
• Presence  
Presence is the operation of naval forces in areas of strategic significance. Presence is 
intended to convey an interest and can take the form of a simple passage through another 
nation’s waters, port visits or exercises.  
Presence is not a threat of force, but a demonstration of capability to reassure, impress or 
warn (RAN, 2010, p. 111). Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations 
are also a part of this headline. U.S. capital ships have been used in these operations, it 
provides presence and creates goodwill. 
 
A recent example of presence is the participation of both a U.S. super carrier and an 
amphibious assault ship in exercise Trident Juncture 2018 in northern Norway (Naval Today, 
2018) or the routine sailing of aircraft carriers through the South China Sea. 
                                                
12 The definition of power projection in this study was; ”A nation’s capability to exert influence in peacetime and 
to secure and exercise sea control in a time of hostilities” (Vego, 2016, pp. 24-25). Within the diplomatic role, 
power projection will primarily comprise of what is done in peacetime. The ability to secure control of the sea in 
times of hostilities will be discussed under the military role, as the ability to secure control of the sea.  
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• Preventive diplomacy and Coercion  
 
Preventive diplomacy aims to prevent disputes from developing or to prevent already on 
going disputes from escalating. A warship’s ability to poise and be persistent is important 
while other parts of diplomacy works through other channels (RAN, 2010, p. 112).    
 
Coercion is used in situations that require more direct action than the mission mentioned 
above. Navies can coerce a potential adversary by demonstrating readiness to deploy 
sufficient combat power to either make his aim unachievable or its consequences 
counterproductive (RAN, 2010, pp. 112-113).  
The deployment of two U.S. carrier battle groups to the area around Taiwan in 1996 is an 
excellent example. The Chinese threat towards Taiwan apparently increased, and two carrier 
battle groups that were already present in the area moved closer to Taiwan (Till, 2018, p. 
382). This is also an example of how a navy can decide to move up the “degree of force 
employed” scale.  
 
Military 
The previous section defined some characteristics of the capital ship and furthermore related 
them to the military role. The characteristics were: 
 
• At sea, the ability to secure control of the sea.  
• From the sea, the ability to support or influence operations and events ashore 
 
These characteristics are perhaps not as easily translated into missions as were the case with 
the diplomatic role. The trinity distinguishes between two different types of missions, combat 
operations at sea and combat operations from the sea.   
 
At Sea – The ability to secure sea control 
Secure sea control in times of war, or if it is contested in any way has been the most 
significant capital ship mission throughout history. As mentioned in previous paragraphs, this 
was done either by engaging the enemy’s capital ships or in other ways blockading them. The 
latent power of capital ships, that is their ability to be able to secure sea control if needed is 
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also seen as having significant value. Several of the modern trinity missions can contribute to 
this task, in this thesis three are selected.  
 
• Maritime strike and interdiction  
This involves combat operations against an adversary’s combat or logistic forces with 
strategic, operational or tactical aims. The strategic aim can be preventing the enemy’s ability 
to fight by preventing their use of the sea. Interdiction of an enemy’s forces will be to prevent 
their use in sea control, sea denial or power projection operations. Interdiction operations will 
normally be conducted by submarines or attack aircraft (RAN, 2010, p. 102).  
A decisive action at sea, is an attack at the enemy’s bases, possible combined with weakening 
the enemy over time as a method to obtain sea control (Vego, 2016, p. 75). 
Destroying an enemy fleet (in its bases or at sea) is the quickest and most effective way of 
establishing sea control, but also the most difficult. It can be carried out in both open ocean 
and littoral seas. There are two examples from the Second World War, where this was 
planned under the cover of an amphibious operation.  
The Americans did it in the Battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944, and the Japanese tried this but failed 
during the Battle of Midway in 1942. Major operations of this scale is however, not likely 
today, because, there are no longer two or more major potential adversaries at sea. A conflict 
between a blue-water navy and a smaller navy in the littorals is therefore more likely. An 
attack on the smaller fleet’s naval bases combined with attacks at sea is the most likely 
method to secure sea control by the larger navy. Long range missiles and carrier based aircraft 
are the likely weapons of choice (Vego, 2017, pp. 55-56).  
 
In the littorals the principal objective of naval forces should be to secure the desired state of 
sea control. This helps create conditions for the accomplishment of other tasks, such as 
support to friendly forces ashore  - a key prerequisite however is obtaining air superiority in 
the littoral in question (Vego, 2017, p. 57).  
 
Securing sea control today also holds an element of engaging targets ashore. Land based 
aircraft and anti-ship missiles are two examples of weapons that can act as sea denial 
weapons. In order to secure the necessary degree of sea control, a capital ship needs to be able 
to counter these threats as well. Other targets can be the destruction or suppression of an 
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enemy’s air defences, command posts and electronic surveillance will have priority (Vego, 
2017, p. 57).  
 
• Containment  
Containment is the act of threat to an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities thus forcing him to 
divert his maritime forces into a defensive role thereby preventing their use in offensive 
operations (RAN, 2010, p. 103). The possibility of using a strategic diversion should be 
emphasised as well (Vego, 2016, p. 76). The U.S. maritime strategy from 1986 described how 
the U.S. could threaten the Soviet Navy’s northern waters and thus their submarine bastions. 
This would force the Soviets to deploy forces for their defence – forces that could have been 
used against NATO’s Atlantic sea lines of communications (Speller, 2014, p. 106).  
 
• Blockade  
Blockade involves denying an enemy access to or from their ports (close blockade) or to a sea 
area (distant blockade). The term has long been connected to a legal definition and when it is 
used in this context (by the U.N.), it is typically associated with operations against an enemy’s 
economy. In this context however, it is used in operations against the enemy’s armed forces 
(RAN, 2010, p. 103).  
During the Cold War the West attempted to blockade Soviet Naval forces from the North 
Atlantic during by closing the gap between Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom and 
Svalbard-Norway – This was, in all but name a distant blockade (Till, 2018, pp. 227-228).  
 
From the Sea 
This is the other military characteristic of the capital ship. The supercarriers are extremely 
multirole, and they can play a significant part in all of the combat missions from the sea.  
In this case, the missions are generally seen as something that takes place once the required 
degree of sea control has been secured.  
Land strike, amphibious operations and support to operations on land and in the air are the 
three that I will connect to the capital ship. Land strike and amphibious operations will be 
covered under one headline.  
 
• Land Strike and amphibious operations 
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Land strike is simply the ability to strike directly at land targets, either by the use of guns, 
missiles or with embarked aircraft (RAN, 2010, p. 106). 
Amphibious assault operations are the landing and establishment of a ground force on a 
hostile shore (Speller, 2014, p.137). Amphibious operations have been conducted a great 
number of times throughout history. The Allied landings in Normandy are the most known, 
but the British landings on the Falkland Islands in 1982 is another example (Speller, 2014, p. 
137).  
 
• Support to operations on land and in the air 
Modern naval forces are able to offer considerable potential to contribute to combat 
operations on land and in the air. This can be in the form of fire support or in the form of 
support from air warfare sensors and weapons thus contributing to counter air operations 
(RAN, 2010, p. 107).  
The U.S. carriers performed numerous supporting operations on land and in the air during the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
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 Part III – The Capital ship in U.S. Naval Strategy 
 
5. Capital influence in a unipolar world (1992-2001) 
This is the first of the analytical chapters, on the basis of the developed framework in part I 
and II it will analyse the role of the capital ship from 1992 to 2001, also referred to as the 
unipolar period.  
 
A prevailing notion through the unipolar period is the notion of sea control being regarded as 
a truism. There were no potential competitors for sea control on the high seas, at least 
according to the United States. This is surely a result of the relative advantage in capital ships, 
which the U.S. enjoyed. 
 
The U.S. dominance has perhaps created a sense of security, and it certainly meant that the 
U.S. Navy became focused on what it was possible to do from the sea rather than 
contemplating about securing sea control.  
 
5.1. Fleet Structure 
The role of capital ships was clear in the U.S. Navy fleet structure through the 1990s. The 
Navy was organised around its capital ships and this was not challenged or discussed in the 
documents or deployments of the 1990s. Technology and joint operations (or jointness) were 
perhaps more significant and they certainly received more attention in terms of fleet 
development, but they were not used to challenge the role of the capital ship in fleet structure.   
 
The numbers from the 1990s show a Navy that became significantly smaller. From 1990 to 
1997 the Navy’s personnel was cut by one third and the carrier force went from 15 to 12 (11 
operational). The cutbacks were greater within surface combatants and nuclear attack 
submarines. Their total number went from 287 to 166. In 1997, some of the planned 
procurements for the 1998-2003 period were 12 additional fast sealift vessels, eight ro-ro 
vessels and seven amphibious assault ships. Within the carrier force, one carrier was planned 
for an overhaul (IISS, 1997, pp. 2-7). 
 
The basic premise for this reduction was the absence of a global peer competitor, and the 
previous paradigm of preparing for a total war at sea became a thing of the past (Garrett III, 
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Kelso II, & Gray, 1991, pp. 24-26). The Navy expected some warning time if a global threat 
should emerge (Garrett III et al., 1991, pp. 30-35). This understanding was embraced fully 
throughout the 90s, and in 2000 the assessment from the Navy remained that no peer 
competitor on a global scale was expected to rise prior to 2020 (USN, 2000, p. 181).  
However, the Navy in the post-Cold War world was still globally deployed. Instead of 
focusing on containing and deterring the Soviet Union the Navy now found itself in a 
situation where it would work toward maintaining global stability. Instead of a single major 
threat the Navy was now likely to face a number regional threats (Garrett III et al., 1991, p. 
26). In essence, it was a case of a smaller navy that still had a large operational area. 
 
In spite of the budgetary reductions and the fact that the U.S. was now the world’s only 
superpower the carrier battle group and amphibious ready group were still the centrepieces of 
the U.S. Navy. In 1991 these groups were described as cornerstones of the Navy, but in the 
future, their composition would be more mission specific (Garrett III et al., 1991, p. 29).  
 
The operating concept to address this new reality was named Forward Presence, and the idea 
was to have carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups forward deployed throughout 
the world, to demonstrate U.S. capabilities and support U.S. interests. Carrier battle groups 
and amphibious ready groups were thus the primary tool in this concept (USN, 1997b, pp. 
161-162). 
 
Due to the cut in fleet size, the groups would become smaller, but because of technological 
advancements the individual ships would be more capable. The airpower provided by the 
carriers would therefore be complemented by the increased firepower distributed by modern 
surface combatants and attack submarines. Effective Tomahawk missile employment was an 
important precursor operation (Garrett III et al., 1991, pp. 33-35). This meant, that the smaller 
ships were no longer there just to protect the capital ships, they had important offensive 
missions of their own as well. These capabilities led to the recognition that the answer to 
every situation may not be a carrier battle group. However, the latent power of such a group 
was still described as overwhelming (USN, 1992, p. 89).  
 
In 2000 the Strategic Planning Guidance reaffirmed the fact that the ability to deploy a 
combat ready carrier battle group (or alternatively an amphibious ready group) was the navy’s 
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core combat force package (USN, 2000, p. 205). The carrier battle group was still the core of 
the navy and its air wing was still the Navy’s primary force enabler (USN, 2000, pp. 227, 
239). When addressing long range planning objectives within forward presence the two top 
priorities were the capability to deploy carrier battle groups (and amphibious ready groups) 
and for forward deployed forces to maintain survivability in the 21st century (USN, 2000, p. 
229).  
 
A major trend, that overlaps all the documents and that may explain the remark about the 
carrier battle group not being the answer to everything is jointness. The ability to land forces 
and sustain forces ashore is a significant area throughout all the documents. In 1992 the Navy 
stated that the force structure needed to be optimised for taking and holding objectives near or 
on the enemy’s coastline (USN, 1992, p. 98). In support of this the ability to conduct sea lift 
and support operations ashore is also emphasised (USN, 1992, p. 94).  
 
This is backed by procurement plans, as mentioned above the expected procurement from 
1998-2003 was 12 sea lift vessels, 8 ro-ro vessels and an additional seven amphibious assault 
ships whereas one of the existing aircraft carriers were planned for an overhaul. Furthermore, 
reductions to the Marine Corps were almost insignificant. This suggests a deliberate turn 
toward a force structure designed to land and sustain forces and not one designed to fight at 
sea.  
 
Technology 
A Modernisation effort and full exploitation of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) were 
two important areas in order to maintain military superiority. A general increased investment 
in science and technology programs were therefore considered important (DOD, 1997, pp. 8-
16). The CNO mentioned how technology may have changed the face of warfare and lead to 
new dimensions of seapower. Naval forces were now capable of projecting power further 
inland than Mahan could ever envision. The future Navy may have been smaller, but 
technology was seen as offsetting the reduction in numbers (USN, 1997a, pp. 172-174).  
 
An example of how RMA was expressed in the navy was through the introduction of the term 
battlespace dominance. Capabilities within command, control and surveillance systems were 
highlighted. Integrated information and networked sensors along with the ability to deny this 
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to the enemy received specific attention, and these were seen as enablers for battlespace 
dominance (USN, 1992, pp. 93-94).  
 
Technology needed to be embraced and incorporated as the Navy transformed from platform-
centric to network-centric warfare (USN, 2000, pp. 205, 258). In fact, in order to conduct 
maritime power projection, the Navy needed forward presence and knowledge superiority. 
The Navy of the year 2000 did have an impressive striking force, but the improvements in 
information technology were used to enhance this (USN, 2000, p. 207).  
 
Embracing and incorporating technology in fleet structure was clearly a major area of interest 
throughout this period but the Navy was not blind when it came to platform numbers. The 
concept of forward deployments, and deployments to more areas than during the Cold War 
would suggest that numbers matter as well. The documents mentioned how the various groups 
should be tailored to each assignment which was necessary because the Navy of the 90s had 
fewer assets than the Navy of the Cold War, but probably also because the perceived threat 
was smaller as well. After all, the capabilities of regional threats were far less significant than 
those posed by the Soviet Navy. Numbers were, however, still a reason for some concern. The 
QDR of 1997 proposed a 305-ship Navy, this was discussed in 2000 and it was noted, that 
this might not be sufficient to meet security challenges in the 21st century (USN, 2000, p. 
217).    
 
To sum up the carrier battle group and amphibious ready group were considered the 
cornerstones of the fleet throughout the unipolar period. The period was dominated by 
budgetary reductions and the military chose to use technology as a way to alleviate these 
cutbacks. Furthermore, the period was dominated by a thought of becoming increasingly 
joint. This meant that the Navy’s role as an enabler became more noticeable, it can be argued 
that the Navy was redesigned to be an enabler for the Marine Corps rather than a Navy in its 
own right. A reason for this could very well be the fact that it was easier for the Marine Corps 
to “sell” and justify their purpose in the post Cold War and Gulf War 1990s. It was probably 
much more difficult to explain why one needed supercarriers in a world without major 
enemies. This aspect certainly also explains the amphibious assault ship as being seen as a 
capital ship as well. 
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A strategy of expeditionary operations and forward presence was therefore chosen; this 
essentially meant that naval forces were continuously forward deployed as a visible 
deterrence and ready to respond to crisis that may arise.  
 
5.2. The Diplomatic Role  
The diplomatic role was a very important role for the navy to promote its capital ships. The 
Cold War was over and with that the navy also lost its only significant enemy. The fact that 
there was no one left to fight on the high sea created an increased focus on diplomatic 
missions. This section will argue two things. The first is that the symbolic value, or the latent 
power of capital ships and how this could support U.S. foreign policy was very important. 
The navy needed to visualise its raison d'être through this role.  
The second is the fact that amphibious assault vessels were now considered close to capital 
ships as well. Jointness was a popular concept in the 90s. The Marine Corps did not 
experience the same “existential crisis” in this period, and the Naval strategies therefore had 
significant focus on presenting the Navy as an enabler for the Marine Corps (and other 
forces).  
 
Presence  
Capital ships were central within this role in the unipolar period. The U.S. needed to take 
advantage of its new role as the sole superpower and keep it. This required presence of capital 
ships in areas of strategic interest.  
 
One of the major concepts of the 1990s was the before mentioned Forward Presence which 
essentially meant having capital ships deployed to and based at areas of strategic interest. 
Once deployed these vessels convey U.S. interests through presence and the demonstration of 
capability.  
Naval forces can be used to shape the future, strengthen alliances and preclude threats. U.S. 
Naval Forces provided powerful and unobtrusive presence. Forward deployed forces could, 
enhance diplomacy and demonstrate U.S. power and resolve (USN, 1992, pp. 89-92).  
 
In other words, the very visual latent power of an amphibious ready group or carrier battle 
group was the centrepiece of Forward Presence.  
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The significance of Forward Presence was highlighted through all the documents of this 
period. It was mentioned how this supported U.S. diplomacy, and how it projected the 
nation’s influence and power through signalling. “Deterrence could be achieved by using 
highly visible symbols of overwhelming U.S. force” (USN, 1997b, pp. 161-163).  A carrier 
battle group or an amphibious ready group were emphasized as tools that send powerful 
signals (USN, 1994b, p. 114).  
 
An obvious way of combining presence with building goodwill is by using capital ships in 
HA/DR missions. Several of these were conducted in the 90s, and they were communicated in 
the naval strategy as well13 (USN, 1994, p. 155). This of course helped the Navy presenting a 
flexible force. 
 
These are clear examples of how the symbolic value of the capital ships and how they are 
employed.  
 
Preventive Diplomacy and Coercion  
Preventive Diplomacy and coercion are also two capital ship characteristics that are present in 
the U.S. Naval strategies of the 1990s. The ability to contain a crisis was mentioned as a 
trademark of forward deployed forces in 1992 (USN, 1992, pp. 89-92).  
 
Forward Presence was used to demonstrate intent, capability and to conduct preventive 
diplomacy. If deterrence failed, naval forces should be able to conduct forcible entry, strikes 
and lay the ground for follow on forces. The capital ships were the building blocks of 
Forward Presence, while surface combatants contributed to deterrence through their ballistic 
missile defence capabilities (USN, 1994a, pp. 151-153).  
The technologic development has expanded the operational capabilities of surface 
combatants. They were no longer “just” escorts for the capital ships, they had become a 
strategic capacity in their own right. In the “missile age” that capacity is increasingly on 
demand.    
A nation with a significant number of capital ships is certainly and attractive ally, but now the 
attractiveness also embraces the surface combatants.  
                                                
13 Forward…From the Sea mentions four missions from 1992-1994, where 10 capital ships were deployed as 
part of HA/DR operations (USN, 1994, p, 155).  
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Several examples of successful coercion with naval forces, and in particular amphibious 
forces are mentioned, Desert Shield most notably14. In addition to this, the advantages and 
flexibility provided by amphibious forces are given a significant amount of attention in the 
first formulation of strategy after the Cold War (Garrett III et al., 1991, pp. 31-33).    
As mentioned in part II, amphibious forces can be of particular value within coercion 
missions. With that in mind, it can be argued that the coercive side of the U.S. Navy have 
been thoroughly expanded through the 1990s with the investments in amphibious assault 
vessels and the fact that the Navy in general shifted its focus from fighting at sea towards 
being an enabler for the Marine Corps and forces ashore. 
Turning toward the Marine Corps and their role, shortly after the Gulf War can also be seen as 
a way of defining a role for the Navy in this new strategic environment.  
 
5.3. The Military Role 
This section will argue three main points. The first is that the concept of sea control of the 
high sea is a truism in the U.S. Navy, and this has been the case since the Second World War. 
This is because of the substantial relative advantage in capital ships. The fact that sea control 
will not be challenged is an underlying condition in naval strategic thinking. The capital ships 
are therefore the pillar of U.S. naval strategy.  
The second point is that strike warfare is increasingly the weapon of choice. The littorals are 
mentioned as a potential challenge. But the strategy does not contemplate on how to address 
this challenge. It is implicit that strike warfare is the solution.  
The last point is part of the operations from the sea, but it supports the case of the littoral 
challenge somewhat. Strike warfare is a cornerstone in the 90s’ power projection navy, and 
the capital ships are the main instrument of this – and the most visible.  
 
The 1990s is perhaps the first decade in modern times where the capital ships of a world 
power did not have a defined adversary. Capital ships did play a role within the tasks of 
securing sea control, but the contribution from technology seems to be appearing as a 
somewhat equal contributor.  
                                                
14 When Iraq invaded Kuwait and considered continuing into Saudi Arabia, the U.S. responded by deploying six 
aircraft carriers, 30-plus amphibious ships, dozens of surface combatants, several attack submarines and more 
than 90.000 active-duty and reserve Marines to the region (Garrett III et al., 1991, p. 29) 
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Within its secondary role, combat operations from the sea, the role of capital ships was 
significant throughout the 1990s.  
 
At Sea – Securing Sea Control 
Sea control and maritime supremacy were mentioned as one of the Navy’s five fundamental 
roles – the others being projection of power from land to sea, strategic deterrence, strategic 
sealift and forward presence (USN, 1994a, p. 158).  
 
Despite the fact that the concept of sea control and its importance was given attention, it was 
usually referred to as something the U.S. Navy already had. 
The Navy had sailed the high seas “virtually unchallenged since the end of World War 2” and 
maintaining this maritime superiority into the 21st century was an important goal (Garrett III 
et al., 1991, pp. 24-25).  
Furthermore, it was highlighted how the U.S. Navy’s ability to command the seas allowed 
them to focus more on the complex littorals of the earth. It was proclaimed, that after the 
“demise of the Soviet Union the free nations of the world claim preeminent control of the seas 
and ensure freedom of commercial maritime passage.” (USN, 1992, p. 89). 
 
These examples from the official documents clearly demonstrates, that the U.S. did not expect 
to find itself in a struggle for sea control against a peer adversary in the foreseeable future, 
focus was now shifting toward the littorals.  
But the examples also hint that this view was perhaps not only a result of the Soviet Union’s 
demise. The Soviet Navy does not seem to have been a serious competitor on the high seas, or 
at least they were not perceived as this, since it was noted that the U.S. had sailed the seas 
virtually unchallenged since World War 2. This can of course be a matter of discussion, and it 
needs to be noted that the Soviet Navy most likely had another view on what mattered at sea. 
As mentioned in part II, Gorshkov saw the aircraft carriers as a useful tool in America’s local 
wars of imperialism (Gorshkov, 1979, p. 221). This is of course a way of subtly implying that 
the Soviet Union did not practise this type of global intervention, and therefore their fleet 
structure was different.  
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Despite the fact that it was not something that was expected, war at sea was discussed, and the 
overall purpose was to achieve sea control. The Navy did however not vision a prolonged 
battle at sea. The range and accuracy of modern weapon systems favoured the side that first 
detected the enemy. This meant that engagements over sea control were likely to be short, and 
probably preceded by a period of increased diplomatic tension (USN, 1994b, p. 119).  
This suggests, that if the Navy for some reason had to fight for sea control, the side that was 
most technologically developed and was able to strike hardest and quickest, was likely to win. 
 
These examples and their context supports the notion that sea control on the high seas was not 
considered as something that would become a challenge. It is not said explicitly, but that kind 
of view must surely rest on the centrepiece of the U.S. Navy – the capital ships. This 
advantage of unrivalled power and therefore broad freedom of action informed how the naval 
strategists framed future operations. 
 
Singaporean Professor Mahbubani backs this approach when he argues that the U.S. Navy is 
the guarantor of freedom on the High Seas (Mahbubani, 2008, p. 108). This notion of an 
implicit degree of sea control can therefore be directly linked to the significant advantage in 
capital ships enjoyed by the U.S. Navy.  
 
The combination of sea control on the high seas being considered as a truism and the fact that 
the U.S. now expected more regional adversaries meant that sea control in the littorals were 
given noteworthy attention. 
This is closely related to another concept, the anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) concept 
that also emerges as a challenge in the 1990s. Another reason for this interest was also 
because of technological developments, which made area denial capabilities more accessible 
(Garrett III et al., 1991, p. 26; USN, 1992, p. 93).    
 
Securing sea control in the littorals and consequently dealing with area denial systems can 
therefore be regarded as the “new sea control” concept of the 1990s. The Navy expected that 
it was likely to face increasing limitations on access and that smaller nations would be 
increasingly better technologically equipped (Garrett III et al., 1991, p. 25).  
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Mastery of the littorals should therefore not be presumed. Many nations were likely to have 
weapon systems that could hamper access and operations in and from the littorals (USN, 
1992, p. 93).  
 
Additionally, The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) expected potential regional adversaries 
to pursue area-denial strategies. The purpose of this was to present a scenario in which entry 
into a region would inflict unacceptable losses on U.S. forces and thereby limiting American 
involvement and influence. (USN, 2000, pp. 181-184). The adversaries are not mentioned by 
name, but it is stated that the U.S. had vital national interests in the Middle East and Korea 
(USN, 2000, p. 184). It is therefore safe to assume that the adversaries in question are 
countries like Iran, North Korea and probably also China.  
 
The Navy does not present a detailed solution or a concept to address these potential 
challenges. The Navy’s role was described, and prioritised as assuring access and projecting 
power (USN, 2000, p. 207).  
 
It must therefore be assumed, that the organisation rest on its unrivalled striking power, of 
which the capital ships of course holds the most.  
 
From the Sea. 
Within their secondary military role, combat operations from the sea, the role of capital ships 
appeared to be substantial in the 1990s. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that the period was 
mainly about conducting power projection in a relatively benign environment.  
 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the U.S. Navy did not have to contemplate too much 
about fighting other navies and could therefore focus on projecting its power ashore – through 
the concepts of Forward Presence and battlespace attack. The concept of battlespace attack 
included the ability to strike from the sea, and this mere capability alone was seen as having a 
deterrent effect.  
The operational concept behind this component was the firepower of a carrier battle group. 
The group’s ability to conduct day and night and all weather strike and combat air support 
operations was highlighted (USN, 2000, pp. 202-203, 248). However, this was not an area the 
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capital ships had to themselves as the tomahawk cruise missile gave the surface combatants a 
capability to strike as well.  
 
This is just one, but there are several examples in the documents through the 90s that 
emphasises the ability to conduct strikes and amphibious assaults ashore.  
 
This is a very clear example of how the U.S. Navy could make itself relevant in the 90s 
thorough its striking capabilities and by being the Marine Corps’ primary enabler. The capital 
ships (the aircraft carrier and the amphibious assault ship) were the primary tools in this 
“statement of purpose”.  
 
5.4. Summary Capital Influence in a unipolar world 
The latent power of the capital ships were the heart of U.S. Naval strategies in the 1990s. 
They were the building blocks of Forward Presence, which was the dominating concept 
throughout the decade. Forward Presence was the means to conducting power projection in a 
benign environment.   
Without the capital ships, there could be no Forward Presence and hence no world influence. 
 
The relative advantage in capital ships, and their power, creates the truism of sea control, and 
this has most likely been the case ever since the Second World War. This perception is the 
foundation for all U.S. naval strategic thinking.  
The littorals are given attention, and it was noted that this could be a challenging area, but the 
only countermeasure seems to the navy’s striking capability. This capability is along with the 
role as the great enabler for forces ashore, are greatly appreciated.  
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6. Capital influence in a collaborative world (2002-2014) 
The influence of capital ships was still significant in U.S. naval strategy throughout the first 
decade of the new millennium. The role was however not as outspoken as it was through the 
1990s, where the capital ships were mentioned as the as the backbone of the dominant 
concept of Forward Presence. The documents that represent U.S. naval strategy 2002 to 2014 
is heavily occupied with the Global War on Terror (GWOT), international collaboration and 
technology.  
 
The role of technology was quite dominant through the 12 years that are examined here, but to 
attribute it to the role of capital ships would not be appropriate. U.S. naval strategy was still 
based on Forward Presence and power projection or in other words being able to exert their 
influence across the globe – and it was the huge relative advantage of capital ships in their 
favour that made this kind of strategic thinking possible. If the U.S. had not enjoyed this 
advantage in capital ships, being technologic superior would have had little influence. 
Whereas an advantage in capital ships, but without the network would still give the U.S. 
significant global influence.  
 
Another example that demonstrates the importance of capital ships in U.S. strategy and thus 
U.S. policy in general can be found in the QDR of 2014. Capital ships were used as a means 
of exerting pressure between the executive and legislative branches of government.  
It is probably a well-known fact that the relationship between the Obama Administration and 
Congress, the body that approves funding, was often difficult (Everett & Sherman, 2016). 
In the QDR, which was published by the administration, it was made clear, that if 
sequestration level cuts were imposed in fiscal year 2016, the aircraft carrier USS George 
Washington would be retired instead of proceeding with its scheduled refuelling and overhaul 
(DOD, 2014, p. 30). 
Capital ships were held in high regard by a Republican controlled Congress (Gady, 2015), and 
the fact that the President was using the threat of retiring a supercarrier if he does not get his 
will is a powerful example of the supercarriers symbolic value15.    
 
 
                                                
15 There were other examples were capital ships were taken hostage in the negotiations between Obama and 
Congress. In 2013 the planned deployment of a supercarrier was used as leverage from the Obama 
administration (Sherwell, 2013).  
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6.1. Fleet Structure 
Although the Navy’s carrier force decreased from 12 in 2002 to 10 in 2014, the role of capital 
ships in naval strategies were still quite significant. In 2014 all carriers were nuclear powered 
as opposed to only nine in 2002 (IISS, 2002, 2014). This of course suggests a deliberate 
choice toward the supercarrier as the capital ships.  
Their significance was re-emphasised in 2006, when it was stipulated by law, that the (U.S. 
Navy was required to maintain a force of no less than 11 operational aircraft carriers 
(Government, 2006).  
Additionally, funding for the incoming Gerald R. Ford-class supercarrier was approved in the 
latter half of this period (O'Rourke, 2018, p. 3).  
 
The total number of major surface combatants also went down from 129 to 107 (IISS, 2002, 
2014).  
These numbers suggest, that the trend from the 1990s with fewer but more capable ships 
continued into the new century. It was most likely a combination of budget cuts and 
technology that drove this development.  
 
These facts of course signals a significant role of capital ships within fleet structure, but there 
were other assets rising within the hierarchy, the surface combatant and the role of technology 
were given significant attention.  
 
“Innovative concepts and technology would mark the beginning of a new era of joint 
operational effectiveness and integrating sea, air, land, cyberspace and space. In this unified 
battlespace the sea would be an area for manoeuvre from where to project decisive power” 
(USN, 2002, p. 1). 
 
“Information gathering and management was the heart of this revolution of striking power” 
(USN, 2002, p. 5). Distributed networked operations was described as the overarching global 
Navy concept (USN, 2006b, p. 17) 
 
The gains of technology were described in very remarkable ways with the beginning of a new 
era and a revolution of striking power. The actual hulls that deliver this striking power is not 
mentioned as a factor. These new achievements were notable but they did not represent a new 
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Dreadnought-type revolution in capital ship thinking. Without the power of the capital ships 
the network would be meaningless.    
 
It is however remarkable, that the U.S. Navy uses technology to emphasise and support their 
superiority and not their advantage in capital ships. The focus on the advantage through 
technology was persistent throughout the period, even when the strategic focus shifted from 
pursuing terrorists toward other states.  
 
It was mentioned in the previous chapter how surface combatants where becoming 
increasingly capable, and this trend certainly continued through this period. This example 
illustrates how technologic progress in the form of hardware (Aegis and missiles) became 
strategically important and these capabilities were not placed on capital ships.   
 
There is little doubt that the role of technology was quite significant, and it was definitely 
more outspoken than the role of capital ships – at least in the naval strategies. The investment 
in the new Ford-class could of course be used to argue against this, but this decision was 
strangely enough not mentioned in any of the documents that constitute naval strategy.  
 
The general level of ambition was not exactly consistent throughout the period. In 2002, the 
CNO described how the global concept of operations required a flexible force structure that 
consisted of different groups; the Carrier Strike Group, Expeditionary Strike Group and the 
Missile defence Surface Action Group16 (USN, 2002, p. 11). 
This outline required a force structure of 375 ships (USN, 2002, p. 11).  
In the 2006 it was noticed that the Navy would remain committed to resourcing a fleet of 
about 313 ships (USN, 2006b, p. 11). 
 
The same year the Navy was directed to increase SEAL team manning and develop a capacity 
within riverine warfare (DOD, 2006, p. 5). 
Navy and Marine Corps tactical aircraft squadrons were integrated thus saving potential $35 
billion and reducing future Navy procurement by almost 500 tactical aircraft (DOD, 2006, p. 
46).  
                                                
16 The Missile defence Surface Action Group would increase stability by providing security to allies and joint 
forces ashore (USN, 2002, p. 11) 
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The tendency away from the War on Terror and toward state versus state competition became 
clear in the 2014 QDR. The report described that the Department was rebalancing towards 
greater emphasis on full spectrum operations, but should maintain superior power projection 
capabilities. A photo of a Carrier Strike Group was placed next to this text (DOD, 2014, p. 
19). The selection of this specific photo was hardly a coincidence. As great power 
competition and the prospect of facing another capable adversary at sea, the symbolic value of 
capital ships was reemphasised.  
 
The capital ships did indeed have a role in U.S. fleet structure from 2002-2014. The role was, 
however, less prominent in the first half of the period than in the latter. This was surely 
because of a focus on the War on Terror in the first half. This led to an increased focus on 
special forces, operating in a low threat littoral environment and in general to stretching the 
resources and supporting the troops on the ground. The Navy was however organised around 
its capital ships, although the increased capability of the surface combatants led them to play 
their own part in naval strategy as well.  
In the latter half of the period, the role of capital ships became more evident. The shift 
happened somewhere between the 2006 QDR and the 2010 Naval Operations Concept, which 
did speak of the World becoming multipolar (USN, 2010, p. 27).  
Full spectrum warfare where again the centre of attention. It led to the Littroal Combat Ship 
(LCS) being questioned for not being able to fight a capable adversary and it led to capital 
ships reappearing as the centre of naval strategy.       
 
6.2. The Diplomatic Role  
Despite the fact that the U.S. for the most part of the collaborative period was pre-occupied 
with the GWOT, a war in which the diplomatic role of navies was less pronounced this 
section will argue, that the capital ships still had great importance, and that these are the first 
to be rolled out whenever the U.S. wanted to demonstrate their power or impose their will on 
other nations.  
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Presence  
This section on presence will demonstrate, that although other ships were given significance 
the capital ships were still the primary tool, if the U.S. wanted to convey an interest.  
 
The Navy planned to maintain a carrier strike group and an amphibious ready group forward 
stationed in the Western Pacific17. It would maintain a forward deployed carrier strike group 
and amphibious ready group in the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean and seek to deploy an 
additional amphibious ready group or marine expeditionary unit (MEU) to shift between the 
regions18 (USN, 2010, p. 30).  
 
These examples clearly demonstrate, that the strategically most important areas were reserved 
for the capital ships.  
There were, however, also examples of how the surface combatants were beginning to rise 
within the hierarchy.  
 
In 2010 it was noted that Combatant Commander’s demand for naval forces particularly 
carrier strike groups, amphibious ready groups, and surface action groups (SAG) had 
exceeded forecast of naval capabilities. Since 2006, requests had grown 29% for carrier strike 
groups, 76% for surface combatants in general and 86% for amphibious ready groups (USN, 
2010, p. 28).  
This lead to more tailoring and a conclusion of that in many missions the best solution was to 
deploy units independently (USN, 2010, p. 29). 
Furthermore, to further support requests for presence cutters from the U.S. Coast Guard was 
rotationally deployed (USN, 2010, p. 32).   
 
These numbers suggest a Navy that is overstretched and in need of units to deploy. This 
coincided with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, increased tensions with North Korea and 
in general a more competitive international system.  
It is interesting to notice that the requests for surface combatants were higher than the requests 
for carrier strike groups.  
                                                
17 This was actually not new as these groups had been stationed in Japan for some time, but they were still used 
as examples in the strategies. 
18 Forward stationed means that the unit has its home base overseas, e.g. Japan. Forward deployed means that the 
unit is based in the United States, but deployed to the mentioned area.  
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It may seem paradoxical, but perhaps the strategic significance of capital ships could explain 
this. A request from a Combatant Commander for a carrier strike group would certainly create 
more attention in Washington than a request for additional surface combatants. This could 
imply that the surface combatants, with its new capabilities, had become a tool that was more 
sought after by military commanders simply because this creates less commotion on the 
strategic level than a request for capital ships. This would also support the tendency toward 
capital ships become a strategic symbol rather than a military tool.  
The fact that amphibious ready groups were in such high demand is surely because of the 
troops they bring with them – something that was in very high regard during the GWOT.    
 
Global terrorism did not venture out to sea, for the most part, but there was still a need for 
countering illegal activity at sea. 
It was recognised that policing the maritime commons19 required substantially more capability 
than the United States or any other nation could deliver. The answer was the 1000-ship navy, 
“a global maritime network that tied together the capabilities of free nations and established 
and maintained international security in the maritime domain” (USN, 2006b, p. 20). This was 
reaffirmed in the Strategy from 2007, where it was noted that the U.S. Navy protected the 
system in company with partners (USN, 2007, p. 4).  
 
The 2007 strategy was probably the closest the U.S. Navy has ever been to resembling 
Geoffrey Till’s post-modern navy, where collaboration and the global commons are key. 
Engaging threats to maritime security did not require powerful warships, and capital ships did 
therefore not play a role at all in addressing this challenge. 
 
Presence was a significant mission in U.S. naval strategy through this period. The strategic 
most important areas were reserved to capital ships. But, there was a need for other ships as 
well, and the collaborative approach to maritime security is an example of this. The capability 
nor the symbolic value of capital ships where therefor not always required. 
Furthermore, an increased demand for Forward Presence led to a more widely distributed 
fleet where other ships were given significance as well – like the surface action groups.  
 
                                                
19 The mission of policing the maritime commons is a mission with great resemblance to the constabulary 
missions of Ken Booth’s naval trinity, an area that is not included in this study. However, the mission is included  
as it serves as an example of the missions that the U.S. was pre-occupied with.   
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Preventive Diplomacy and Coercion 
Deterrence may have had little value against the likes of Al Qaeda, but in spite of this, these 
operations were still important and the capital ships were widely used within these missions, 
as this section will argue. In addition, it will argue, that as the world became more competitive 
the prominence of capital ships rose in the naval strategies.  
 
Even though the War on Terror may have left the Navy somewhat side-lined through the first 
half of this period, it was still policy that the country required a Navy strong enough to deter 
any adversary and support diplomacy around the world (USN, 2006a, pp. 3-4; 2006b, p. 7).  
A force that had enormous symbolic value and was capable of doing just that was the 
expeditionary strike group (ESG). 
An amphibious ready group and a carrier strike group would periodically be aggregated into 
an expeditionary strike group, which would serve to demonstrate and sustain the ability to 
operate a force of this size. These forces protected U.S. interests, assured friends and deterred 
and dissuaded potential adversaries (USN, 2010, p. 30).  
The presence of a fleet of this scale was surely the most powerful way of conveying an 
interest, which of course serves to reaffirm the role of capital ships.  
 
The strategy from 2007 mentioned how maritime BMD would enhance deterrence by 
providing an umbrella of protection to forward deployed forces (USN, 2007, p. 13). This is a 
capability that is delivered by the surface combatants, and there is little doubt that it was 
important, but there is a tendency toward increased focus on capital ship capabilities as the 
collaborative period moved toward the competitive period.   
 
The capital ships represented the most versatile and lethal tool in the Navy’s arsenal. A carrier 
strike group was described as mobile, lethal and it could be applied across the full range of 
military operations. It was described how an aircraft carrier and its embarked air wing were 
capable of dominating key aspects of the maritime domain for hundreds of miles. The carrier 
strike group’s surface combatants and submarines could conduct land attack missile strikes 
and protect the force from surface, subsurface and air threats including ballistic missiles 
(USN, 2010, p. 60). This is basically a presentation of a full-spectrum capable force from 
2010, capable of addressing a lot more capable adversaries than Al Qaeda.  
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6.3. The Military Role 
The military role of naval forces became more complex in this period as sea control and 
power projection against peer and non-peer competitors became more difficult. This section 
will argue that although the link between capital ships and sea control became weaker, it was 
still there. The littorals where still the centre of attention, but the Navy was beginning to 
consider more limited threats on a global scale. The Navy did say that the world was 
becoming multi-polar, but this did not lead to a perceived peer challenger on the high seas. 
Instead it was the increased A2/AD threats, most certainly from China, that was considered 
the greatest challenge – and the capital ships did have a key role in countering this. 
 
At Sea – Securing sea control Ability to secure sea control 
Sea control and the ability to use the sea as a place for manoeuvre, received much attention 
throughout the period. Capital ships did play a significant role within this mission, however 
sea control and access were no longer exclusively connected with capital ships.  
 
The big difference between this period and the 1990s appear to be the recognition of the fact 
that the operating environment was not as benign as it was during the 1990s – especially in 
the littorals.  
 
Sea control was important in the years from 2002 to 2014. The CNO referred to it as an 
“enduring mission”, but stressed that it was necessary to develop “transformational ways of 
fulfilling it” (USN, 2002, pp. 2-3).  
These transformational ways are made a bit more specific in 2010 when it was stated that 
“naval forces achieved sea control by neutralizing or destroying threats in the maritime, space 
and cyberspace domains” (USN, 2010, p. 53). 
 
Anti-access capabilities were able to hold naval forces hundreds of miles away at risk, thus 
reducing U.S. ability to accomplish military objectives with minimal losses. It was however 
concluded that U.S. naval forces possessed the capability to mitigate the risks to an acceptable 
level (USN, 2010, p. 55) 
 
The Operations Concept from 2010 offers the most comprehensive approach to the “how” 
when discussing missions of sea control in an A2/AD environment.  
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Like the 1990s the concept of Forward Presence facilitated all other naval missions, most 
importantly sea control (USN, 2010, pp. 25-26). However, unlike the strategies of the 1990s 
the carrier strike group or the amphibious ready group were no longer specifically mentioned 
as the core of Forward Presence. In fact, because of the need for more widely distributed 
forces it was noted that in some cases it could be necessary to deploy units independently 
(USN, 2010, p. 29). This was described by the Navy as increased tailoring, which should 
probably be seen as another word for stretching the resources.   
 
The goal was to conduct effective regional and local sea control operations. Against a capable 
adversary, this required assistance from land based aircraft for ISR.  
Sea control operations were specifically defined as:  
 
“The employment of naval forces, supported by land and air forces as appropriate, in order to 
achieve military objectives in vital sea areas. Such operations include destruction of enemy 
naval forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce, protection of vital sea-lanes, and 
establishment of local military superiority in areas of naval operations” (USN, 2010, pp. 51-
52). 
 
This section is very interesting, because it effectively states that the Navy required the 
assistance of other services if it was to secure sea control in a hostile environment and it 
defined sea control, as a joint operation were the Navy was the supported branch. The capital 
ship’s historically strong attachment to mission of securing sea control was gradually being 
diluted.   
 
On the other hand, the role of technology appeared to increase as it was stated that “superior 
warfare systems provided robust air and missile defence, effective undersea warfare and 
flexible network-centric attack options, in general through superiority in technology” (USN, 
2010, pp. 56-57). These systems are of course also fitted on capital ships, but they are not 
exclusively on the capital ship. In addition to this, the increasing capabilities of A2/AD 
weapons coupled with an aversion to risking the capital ships could lead to the ships being 
placed even longer from the fight. Risk aversion is not new within capital ship thinking. 
Historically nations have been cautious about risking their capital ships because losses could 
lead to instant change in the international balance of power. This is not exactly the case in this 
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period; the U.S. advantage in capital ships was substantial. The potential loss of a capital ship 
to enemy fire would not have shifted the balance of power in the world but it would certainly 
have been a huge loss in prestige and probably even more so than 9/11 was. There would 
probably be an expectation of similar reactions or more. 
 
Establishing sea control in a hostile littoral environment included advanced networked space-
based sensors, long range UAV, locally deployable air, surface and subsurface multi spectrum 
ISR systems. Carrier air wings would provide air superiority over the area (USN, 2010, p. 65). 
Strike operations, executed primarily by the aircraft carrier’s embarked air wing and surface 
and sub-surface launched land attack missiles, were identified as the principal means of 
gaining and maintaining operational access (USN, 2010, p. 70). 
 
This approach is an example of the connection between capital ships and sea control. Access 
was gained through strike, with the carrier air wing in a central role. Once the fleet reached 
the littoral the air wing was again central, this time by providing air superiority. The 
versatility of the capital ships was still distinctively superior, although surface combatants and 
strike submarines could perform many of these functions. These descriptions on how to 
address A2/AD capabilities demonstrate that this is very complex and a variety of forces and 
capabilities are required. The capital ship is arguably the one asset that can do most through 
the air wing’s versatility, but to leave the mission of securing sea control, or in this case 
countering A2/AD, to capital ships alone is indeed a thing of the past.  
 
From the Sea 
Operations from the sea, is not as easy when it can be necessary first to fight for sea control in 
the adjoining waters, as the rise of A2/AD threats resulted in.  
This fact led to operations from the sea receiving less attention in this period, though it was 
not completely forgotten.   
The capital ships were the major provider of capabilities in this area, but again, other assets 
were becoming relevant as well.  
 
The carrier strike group was described as the core of the warfighting strength, and that it 
provided the full range of operational capabilities. No other was able to match its power 
projection capabilities and combat survivability (USN, 2002, pp. 10-11). There is little doubt 
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that like the 1990s, the carrier strike group, and its ability to conduct strikes from the sea is 
attributed great significance. It seems that mentioning capital ships, have become a reflex 
movement when discussing power projection.  
 
Sea Basing was mentioned as a concept that provided the foundation for power projection. In 
essence, Sea Basing was not that different from Forward Presence. The main idea behind Sea 
Basing was to deliver firepower and influence from the sea. Forward presence was the 
concept that got the ships there; Sea Basing was the concept that put them into action when 
events ashore needed attention. 
Sea Basing had three pillars; aircraft carriers, multi-mission destroyers and submarines (USN, 
2002, pp. 7-8). The capital ships were therefore not the sole provider of these capabilities, but 
it was the only ship that was somewhat indispensible because its air wing gave it stronger 
mission flexibility. 
 
In addition to these missions, the capital ships where able to perform additional functions. 
They were used immediately post 9/11 to conduct Non-combatant Evacuation Operations 
(NEO) and presence in the north Arabian Sea (USN, 2006a, pp. 28-29). It was also mentioned 
how the capabilities that allowed naval forces to project and sustain combat power were the 
same that allowed them to overcome limited local infrastructure, e.g. command and control 
capabilities, flight decks, well decks and (USN, 2010, p. 63). Finally the carrier strike group 
was described as mobile, lethal and it could be applied across the full range of military 
operations. An example from Operation Enduring Freedom was highlighted when an 
expeditionary strike group was formed from four carrier strike groups and two amphibious 
ready groups. The aircraft carriers provided the strike sorties, while the surface combatants 
employed precision guided cruise missiles and interdiction operations. The embarked marines 
where the first conventional forces ashore in Afghanistan. Projected and supported from the 
North Arabian Sea (USN, 2010, pp. 61-62). 
These last examples clearly illustrates a significant role for capital ships within military 
missions that are not related with sea control.  
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6.4. Summary Capital influence in a collaborative world (2002-2014) 
The capital ships where not as explicitly dominant in naval strategies of the period. They did 
however, have important roles to play within the most important missions. This suggests that 
their role was more implicit. 
 
The long-standing connection between sea control and capital ships are no longer as strong. 
Achieving sea control in a littoral environment is what occupied U.S. naval strategy 2002-
2014. The capital ship’s role in this was gaining access from the open ocean and subsequently 
to provide air superiority over the littoral environment. These tasks were of cause 
prerequisites for further operations, and on that notion it can be stressed that the capital ships 
role were significant.  
 
Capital ships were very important as a means of diplomacy as well, a carrier strike group was 
in itself presented as powerful and capable on several occasions. This was taken to new levels 
when they aggregated into expeditionary strike groups.  
The prominence attributed to amphibious assault ships that we saw in the 90s was not as 
strong in this period.  
 
The status and importance of capital ships were not confined to the Navy. Through the period 
Congress passed a law, which ordered the Navy to have a minimum number of aircraft 
carriers available at any given time. Furthermore, aircraft carriers were used as a means of 
exerting pressure between the different branches of Government. This suggests that the 
aircraft carrier have grown into something more than just a big ship. It certainly supports the 
notion from the previous chapter, that capital ships were the pillar around which all other 
strategic thinking was done.  
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7. Capital influence in a competitive world and beyond (2014-) 
In the 2015 naval strategy, then CNO Admiral Greenert declared:  
 
“The centrepiece of naval capability remains the Carrier Strike Group and Amphibious Ready 
Group…These ships, aircrafts, Sailors and Marines have deterred and defeated aggression 
since World War II and will continue to do so well into the future” (USN, 2015, p. 23). 
 
This statement is a clear indicator of the continued significance of the role of capital ships. 
However, the time after 2014 was, in reality, a bit more nuanced than what the CNO 
expresses in the strategy. The part about defeating aggression does not seem to include these 
ships in the future as it is layed out in the strategic documents.  
 
7.1. Fleet Structure 
If the role of capital ships had been significant in U.S. naval fleet structure up until 2014 it 
became more disputed after 2014 – even though the return of great power competition could 
have suggested otherwise.  
Alternatives to the supercarrier were investigated and at the same time the role of other major 
surface combatants continued to grow, even sparking a new concept called Distributed 
Lethality with the entire fleet of surface combatants as the distributors.  
Despite these debates, the capital ship’s central role within the U.S. Navy remained  
 
Numbers 
The numbers of the fleet inventory pr. 2018 are not considerably different from the numbers 
of 2014. In fact, the only real difference is an extra aircraft carrier (IISS, 2014, p. 45; 2018, p. 
50).   
With the extra aircraft carrier, the Navy was back at 11 carriers, which they were legally 
required to have (O'Rourke, 2018, p. 1)20.  
The extra aircraft carrier was certainly needed, as the Navy struggled to meet operational 
requirements with its carrier force. In late 2016 and early 2017, there was a gap in aircraft 
carrier presence in the Arabian Gulf (IISS, 2018, p. 33).  
 
                                                
20 The Navy operated with only 10 carriers between the inactivation of the aged USS Enterprise and 
the commissioning of the USS Gerald R. Ford, because Congress provided a waiver that allowed the 
Navy to operate with just 10 carriers in this time period (O'Rourke, 2018, p. 1) 
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Additionally, the Navy had other concerns. From 1987 to 1997 the Navy lost 40% of their 
number of ships while the budget decreased by 35%. From 1997 to 2015 the number of ships 
further decreased by 20% only this time the base budget grew by nearly 50% (Larter, 2017).  
These numbers suggest that operating a technologically advanced navy is very expensive. 
Furthermore, the CNO did not expect budgets to increase significantly in the future 
(Richardson, 2016, p. 13-14).   
 
For the first time in the post Cold War era the future of capital ships were now discussed, 
which perhaps was somewhat paradoxical given the return of great power competition. It can 
be argued that the competition manifested in direct threats to capital ships, and this led to the 
discussions.   
It was, however, decided to continue with the Ford-class carrier programme, which 
essentially meant that capital ships remained in their current form21. But their role in a Navy 
that became increasingly preoccupied with near pear competition became more complexly 
defined.   
 
In 2017, the then chairman of the Senate’s armed services committee, Senator John McCain, 
published a report with his recommendations for future U.S. military force structure. He had 
two major points regarding the future navy force structure.  
McCain suggested that the Navy pursued a so-called high/low mix of its aircraft carrier fleet. 
He saw the traditional supercarriers as necessary to deter and defeat near-peer adversaries, but 
other missions such as power projection, sea lane control, close air support or 
counterterrorism could be achieved with smaller, cheaper and conventionally powered aircraft 
carriers. He suggested that the Navy began a transition from large deck amphibious ships into 
smaller aircraft carriers22 (McCain, 2017, p. 10).  
McCain was often seen as someone that went against the flow, also within the defence 
discourse. However, he was not alone in suggesting an alternative fleet structure.  
In 2018 the U.S. Senate’s defence bill, decided to allocate 30 million dollars to the 
investigation of a preliminary design effort to create a light carrier (Mizokami, 2017, p. 2).  
                                                
21 It was of course too late to change plans for the first two Ford-class carriers, as the first the USS Gerald R. 
Ford was launched in 2013 and the second the USS John F. Kennedy was already under construction and 
scheduled to be launched in 2019.  
22 This idea actually shares many ideas with the Sea Control Ship proposed by Pete Pagano, who suggested using 
the Wasp or America-class amphibious assault ships as a test bed for light carriers (Pagano, 2017, pp. 1-10) 
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The problem was that supercarriers were growing unaffordable. The USS Gerald R. Ford, 
which is the only supercarrier, built in this decade was two years behind schedule and 22% 
over budget. A light carrier could be an ideal alternative to super carriers for less dangerous 
conflict zones that still require airpower. During wartime a light carrier could escort convoys 
or augment a supercarrier’s firepower against a peer adversary (Mizokami, 2017, p. 3).  
And independent and nonpartisan CSBA23 report proposed a high/low mix as well, 
specifically it suggested 12 nuclear powered carriers and 10 light conventionally powered 
carriers (Clark et al., 2017, p. 45). 
 
On the other hand a RAND study from the same time analysed future carrier options as well. 
It concluded that that in the end a Ford-class carrier or something very similar would be best 
(Martin & McMahon, 2017, pp. 63-65). There are however, a few central points to note from 
the RAND study. Firstly, its focus was analysing whether the Nimitz-class supercarrier should 
be replaced with something other than the Ford-class. It did not study the high/low concept. 
Secondly the study was focused on carrier performance in combat, where the larger carriers 
had more endurance, survivability and were able to generate more aircraft sorties (Martin & 
McMahon, 2017, pp. xvii-xviii).  
    
Eventually Congress decided for fiscal year 2019 that the U.S. should expedite procurement 
of supercarriers, and a new Ford-class carrier should be authorized every three years as 
opposed to previously planned five years (O'Rourke, 2018, p. 29). 
 
Developing an alternative design to the Ford-class was in the end not considered cost 
beneficial. A smaller design would incur significant design and engineering cost while 
reducing magazine size, carrier air wing and other vital factors. Additionally, a new design 
would delay the introduction of future aircraft carriers thus increasing existing carrier gap and 
threatening national security (O'Rourke, 2018, p. 29). 
It was also decided, that from 2022 the Navy should be statutorily required to operate 12 
operational aircraft carriers (O'Rourke, 2018, p. 29).  
 
This debate is very revealing. It can be viewed as merely a discussion about aircraft carriers in 
the U.S. Navy. It is, however, much more than that. It is about the future role of capital ship 
                                                
23 Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
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thinking. In this case, the Ford-class represents the next step within capital ship design. 
Because the U.S. has continued the Ford-class programme instead of rethinking the fleet 
structure or the capital ships place within this, the role of the capital ship appears to remain 
within the current paradigm. Adapting the high/low mix concept, should however not be seen 
as a challenge as such, this concept still requires supercarriers, but perhaps not the same 
number.   
 
Congress’ decision to proceed with the Ford-class was weighed against the alternatives 
illustrated in the RAND report, which were alternatives to replacing the Ford-class with 
something else. The high/low mix concept proposed by the CSBA report and McCain did not 
exclude supercarriers. This concept is still a possibility, as the Navy was directed to study 
various options for a light carrier. 
 
The fact that these discussions took place (and are still taking place) is surely because the 
challenge to capital ships were now evident. Historically the same discussions took place 
when the invention of the submarine threatened the battleship.  
 
The role of the capital ship within U.S. fleet structure is therefore still significant, and it will 
likely remain so. The previous chapter suggested, that supercarriers had been elevated to 
mythological status in the U.S., and so far the decision concerning the Ford-class supports 
this view.      
 
Technologic advances continued their impact on naval operations, perhaps even changing the 
nature of those operations altogether.  
McCain also suggested that the Navy accelerate its current unmanned aerial vehicle 
programme. Specifically he suggested that the Navy began developing an unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) system for long-range strike and surveillance missions (McCain, 2017, p. 10).  
 
This was actually also a part of CNO Richardson’s design for maintaining maritime 
superiority. Exploring alternatives to fleet structure, such as unmanned systems, was one of 
his four lines of effort. The three others were, modernising the strategic nuclear submarines, 
to be prepared for “blue-water scenarios”, and to move further within the realms of 
information warfare (Richardson, 2016, p. 15-16).  
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To sum up, the capital ships role within U.S. fleet structure post 2014 has not been smooth 
sailing or business as usual. Politicians have begun to raise questions, and options are being 
considered. But, it is however important to note, that no one was suggesting or seriously 
considering a move away from supercarriers as the capital ship. If a high/low mix becomes 
reality it will support the supercarriers not replace them.  
The closest thing the Navy came to considering an alternative approach was the CNO stating 
the need to explore alternative fleet designs, manned and unmanned systems (Richardson, 
2016, pp. 15-16).  
Despite the questions, the U.S. Navy is for now continuing its path of a capital ship centred 
force structure.   
 
7.2. The Diplomatic Role 
The strategic documents published after 2014 clearly express a turn toward a competitive 
rather than collaborative navy. Geoffrey Till described the Strategy of 2015 as a turn toward 
war fighting and hard power thinking (Till, 2015, pp. 36-37).   
  
Presence  
The concept of Forward Presence was still central to U.S. strategic thinking, and this section 
will demonstrate how the capital ship was and still is the centrepiece although they were still 
supplemented by other ships.  
 
An important focal point in the strategy of 2015 is the strong connection between Forward 
Presence, stability and therefore peace. The carrier strike group had an essential role in this, it 
was consequently referred to as either the centrepiece of naval capability (USN, 2015, p. 23), 
the crown jewel of Forward Presence (USN, 2017, p. 79) and possessing overwhelming 
combat power (USN, 2015, p. 22).  
 
The concept of Distributed Lethality was introduced in 2016, as a strategy for the surface 
combatants.  It will be further discussed in the next section. But, one of the principles in this 
concept was a more widely distributed surface fleet, which in turn helped create more 
presence (USN, 2016, pp. 4, 18).  
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Previous strategies did mention areas of strategic importance, and therefore areas where 
capital ship presence was prioritised. This is also the case with the 2015 strategy, but it is 
significantly more detailed.  
The Indo-Asia-Pacific region was highlighted as an area of special interest (USN, 2015, p. 1). 
A carrier strike group and amphibious ready group would therefore remain permanently based 
in Japan. An attack submarine and smaller surface ships would be deployed to Guam and 
Singapore (USN, 2015, p. 11). In the Middle East they planned on an increased presence from 
30 ships to 40 ships by 2020 and to continue the rotational deployment of carrier strike and 
amphibious ready groups (USN, 2015, p. 13).  
In comparison, Africa can perhaps be regarded as an area of lesser strategic importance; there 
the Navy planned to provide presence with so-called adaptive force packages such as the Joint 
High Speed Vessel (USN, 2015, p. 16).  
 
The 1000-ship navy was a concept to increase presence in the collaborative period, and this is 
not given much attention in the competitive period. However, the principle of generating 
presence trough others remained.  
 
It was important to be on good terms with allies that have capital ships of their own.  
Two allies were mentioned by name, France and the United Kingdom (USN, 2015, pp. 5, 14)  
Royal Navy personnel were mentioned as being embarked in a carrier strike group’s staff and 
France was highlighted in relation to combined carrier strike group cooperation. The 
interoperability with both Britain and France was emphasised as a priority (USN, 2015, p. 
14). Whereas the four BMD capable destroyers permanently deployed to Spain was presented 
as U.S. contribution to NATO (USN, 2015, pp. 14-15). The choice of words is interesting, 
because it clearly implies that Britain and France were considered somewhat equal whereas 
NATO in general, was someone that is supported. This clearly suggests that only countries 
with capital ships of their own were considered peers.   
A derivative effect of such good corporation would certainly also lead to the fact that these 
nations’ capital ship can, in some cases represent American/Western interests in their areas of 
operation.  
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Presence can be summed up very easily – it is important and ensures peace. The Navy is 
required to show presence in many areas and this leads to prioritisation. The capital ships are 
present in the most strategic important areas. 
 
Preventive Diplomacy and Coercion 
According to the Navy, changes in the security environment were among the reasons why the 
overarching strategy from 2007 needed an update (USN, 2015, p. 1). The assertiveness of 
Russia and China drove this change. The countries were specifically mentioned as sources of 
international instability (Pandolfe, 2016, p. 10). 
 
Naval aviation was the “mailed fist” of the U.S. Navy’s striking power (USN, 2017, p. 1), 
and when discussing deterrence in the 2015 Strategy it is highlighted that this was provided 
by the overwhelming combat power of the carrier strike group. The strike capability of the 
surface combatants and the amphibious ready group are also prominent  (USN, 2015, p. 22). 
An interesting circumstance, and certainly one that is different in this period compared with 
the 90s is that the role of the amphibious ready group is greatly diminishing. This is no doubt 
because of the fact, that with high-end threats at sea, the Navy had a lot of more classic naval 
tasks to perform. 
 
It is therefore safe to say, that great power competition in the international system, and at sea, 
is back. However, even if top Navy officials, and the strategy itself, had not stated this fact 
directly it would still have been obvious from studying the documents. The deterrent value of 
naval forces is emphasised several places, and it is often highlighted as one of the qualities 
gained through Forward Presence (USN, 2015, p III), and the capital ships role in this 
concept has been described as both the centrepiece (USN, 2015, p. 23), and the crown jewel 
(USN, 2017, p. 79). This is a very powerful choice of words and the Navy seems determined 
in conveying a message. The strategy was eventually translated into several languages 
including Mandarin (Till, 2015, p. 41).  
 
Capital ships are therefore the primary tool whenever, the U.S. Navy wants to demonstrate 
their power. The importance of keeping this tool and to be on the forefront compared to rising 
competitors was demonstrated by the procurement of additional Ford-class carriers.  
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Additionally, Congress decided to increase the number of aircraft carriers that the Navy is 
statutory required to operate (O'Rourke, 2018, p. 29). This is the first time in the post-Cold 
War era that the required number of capital ships is increased.  
 
7.3. The Military Role 
At Sea – Sea Control 
Operations at sea have certainly grown in importance since 2014. This is surely because of the 
return of great power competition.  
This fact has led to the U.S. Navy to pay more attention to the ability to operate on the High 
Seas. In previous strategies, freedom of manoeuvre here was implicit. This is no longer the 
case, and one of the CNO’s four lines of effort for maintaining superiority at sea was that 
combat at sea must address blue-water scenarios (Richardson, 2016, pp. 13-14). This was 
certainly new compared with previous strategies. Security in the global commons and 
countering A2/AD challenges were still important, but these were not among the CNO’s four 
lines of effort.  
 
So far this study has argued that the connection between capital ships and securing sea control 
was still there, although capital ships were no longer alone in this mission. Now it appears, 
that the link has become quite weak. This section argues, that while the capital ships are 
perhaps not excluded from the mission they are certainly no longer the prime assets. It will 
also argue, that a reason for this is that capital ships have in fact become more of an American 
symbol rather than a military tool – A symbol that the country is very unwilling to place in 
harms way.  
 
The capability to operate from a sea base was seen as a “crown jewel” of Forward Presence, 
sea control, and power projection (USN, 2017, p. 79).  
These statements of course support the notion of capital ships as being important in the U.S. 
Navy’s military missions. However, the statements also appeared to be very value-laden and 
rooted in the psychological value of the capital ships and less in their actual combat role. The 
documents are very reluctant with describing their role in a near peer war.   
 
In 2016, the Navy published the concept of Distributed Lethality as an operational and 
organisational principle for achieving and sustaining sea control at will (USN, 2016, p. 2). 
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This concept was interestingly enough not centred around capital ships but instead the surface 
combatants. 
Distributed Lethality was to be achieved by “increasing offensive and defensive capabilities 
of individual warships and employing them dispersed across a wide expanse of geography” 
(USN, 2016, p. 9).  
 
The Navy, however, neglected to say how this would be achieved. As discussed under force 
structure, the Navy, despite all intents, was not likely to become much bigger. Surface 
combatants were still required to perform their role as escorts in carrier strike groups and 
amphibious ready groups and they also had BMD missions of their own. The surface force is 
only so large, and it is therefore quite difficult to see, where theses ships should come from.  
A concept like this also requires ships to be equipped differently. U.S. destroyers had for the 
most part been fitted to conduct strike and air defence roles. The last U.S. destroyer to be 
fitted with Harpoon anti-ship missiles was launched in 1997, all destroyers built since have 
been built around air defence. Their only anti-surface weapons are SM-2 missiles designed for 
air-defence, and their gun (Cummings, 2016, p. 2). Of the potential adversaries, China, have 
fitted every surface combatant built since 1990 with anti-ship cruise missiles.  
 
Additionally, China apparently enjoys a significant advantage in fleet load and range of their 
anti-ship cruise missiles. The Harpoon has a range of 65 nm as opposed to the 100-290 nm, 
which is the assessed range of three of the Chinese missile types (YJ-18, YJ-62 and YJ-83). 
Furthermore, the Chinese warheads and numbers outmatch the Harpoon as well (Cummings, 
2016, p. 4). U.S. procurement of new over the horizon anti-ship missiles has been 
complicated by the fact that most bidders have decided to withdraw from the competition 
(IISS, 2018, p. 33). There are plans in place to develop or procure new anti-ship capabilities, 
but it is safe to say that the U.S. Navy is firmly behind their Chinese counterparts in this area.  
 
On this basis, it is very difficult to see neither the value nor the realistic prospects of 
Distributed Lethality.  With the current capabilities in the fleet inventory, the U.S. Navy is 
simply not designed to fight another navy at sea with other means than strike warfare, of 
which the aircraft carrier is the largest weapon. This may be enough in a littoral environment, 
but this is not the case of blue-water combat.  
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Furthermore, it is quite interesting to discuss the concept in relation to capital ships. Should it 
be seen as a replacement, a supplement or was it a result of a more competitive environment. 
The capital ships military post-Cold War role were mainly assuring access and conducting 
strikes. Distributed Lethality is undoubtedly a result of the resurgent need for being able to 
secure sea control on the High Seas combined with the relative disadvantage in anti-ship 
capabilities from which the U.S. Navy suffered. Capabilities that constituted severe threats to 
capital ships. Distributed Lethality should therefore be seen as a result of the competitive 
environment. It is both a concept for securing sea control and it keeps the capital ships away 
from the frontline. However, if the concept is tested before the relative disadvantage in anti-
ship capabilities are levelled, it is difficult to imagine the capital ships not being employed to 
fight at sea to cover the current weaknesses.   
 
From the Sea 
The prospect of facing other nations at sea did not lead to operations from the sea becoming 
insignificant. However, there are some interesting developments to be seen within this area 
post 2014. The capital ships were still essential.  What is surprising however, is the fact that 
this mission now seems to be reserved for the capital ships – This will be the main point of 
this section.  
The role of major surface combatants has been marginalised in comparison with earlier 
periods. This is especially interesting given the fact that the USS Zumwalt, the Navy’s newest 
destroyer type was commissioned in late 2016 – a ship type that was supposedly tailored for 
land attack (USN, 2017, p. 37).  
 
In the introduction to the cooperative strategy the benefits of naval power are explained: 
“Coming from the Sea, we get there sooner, stay there longer, bring everything we need with 
us and we do not have to ask anyone’s permission” (USN, 2015, p. I). This is perhaps a relic 
from strategic thinking of the 1990s, where the environment was very benign. The strategy 
does, however, also use a post 9/11 example where capital ships made a difference. Two 
amphibious ready groups conducted amphibious assault operations 350 nm from the coast and 
created a bridgehead for further operations in Afghanistan (USN, 2015, p. 12).   
Furthermore, the carrier air wing is highlighted as the Navy’ preeminent strike capability 
(USN, 2015, p. 19).  
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Apart from these statements, conduct of operations from the sea are not given much attention 
in the official strategy. This trend is followed by the CNO in his design for maintaining 
maritime superiority.  
 
The return to state versus state competition has certainly shifted the focus of U.S. strategic 
thinking within the military role. 
Previous chapters have addressed the fact that the surface combatant has become a capability 
in its own right. Although this did not replace the capital ship’s role it did present a challenge 
or a supplement depending on how it is viewed. This was certainly the case within operations 
from the sea, where its strike capabilities could be brought to effect. Post 2014 the surface 
combatant’s part in this mission is less significant. This is no doubt because of their 
envisioned role within the Distributed Lethality concept. This can perhaps be viewed 
somewhat as a paradox since the surface combatants are still optimised in the strike role, as 
mentioned in the former paragraph.  
 
When it comes to operations at sea, capital ships are important, but the strategies does not 
really tell why and how – except for their strike capabilities. This suggests that they are 
valued more for their psychological value than their combat value. Psychological value has 
always been a feature of capital ships. But how does the U.S. Navy envision employing them 
in a near peer fight? Have their psychological value perhaps become so high, that the thought 
of placing them at risk have become unattainable and the surface combatants have therefore 
been designated as the fighting force?  
 
 
7.4. The future of the supercarrier as the capital ship in U.S. naval strategy 
The purpose of this subchapter is to analyse the role of the supercarrier as the capital ship in 
U.S. naval strategy in the future. To answer this question one needs to discuss the nature of 
the current capital ship, the threats it will face and the sustainability of continuously 
introducing rapidly developing new technologies. An assumption behind this chapter is that 
capital ships, as long as it is a physical hull, will remain aviation platforms.   
 
The role of unmanned vehicles will not be discussed explicitly in this subchapter. This is not 
to deny their role, which is likely to increase in future military options. At the current 
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technological state, these vehicles are, however, not seen as a direct challenger to the role of 
capital ships. UAVs may well be an alternative to manned aircrafts in the future. However, 
whether the aircraft in an air wing are manned or not is not relevant in relation to the aircraft 
carrier’s strategic importance.  
 
The chapter will primarily discuss the challenge from technology, or the network as the future 
capital ship, a view that has been put forward by some thinkers.  
Lastly the chapter will discuss the ship itself and its role, eventually concluding that the 
current paradigm is not likely to change significantly in the near future.  
 
Technology – The network.  
The idea behind the network as the future equivalent to the capital ship rests on the notion of 
an entire fleet connected by a battle-force-network. The network consists of a number of 
nodes processing various information, orders, targeting etc. This should allow for a more 
effective distribution of fire over longer ranges (Rubel, 2017, pp. 6-9).  
 
Rubel argues that the missile has probably become the most dominant and decisive weapon at 
sea, and this leads to the capital ship becoming vulnerable. Missile technology favours the 
tactical offensive, which means that if the U.S. Navy wants to secure access to an area where 
the adversary has capable A2/AD weapons the U.S. Navy has to strike first, but if the 
enemy’s offensive power is hidden this can be very difficult which essentially places the 
aircraft carrier at risk (Rubel, 2017, pp. 6-7). There is however a role for the aircraft carriers 
in this concept. They should become escorts of the network, which of course requires physical 
nodes. The carriers would operate from behind, away from the anti-ship missile threat but still 
close enough to be able to provide air cover over Distributed Lethality forces (Rubel, 2017, 
pp. 7-9). 
  
A concept like this can certainly be decisive in times of hostilities, but it too has its 
weaknesses. A network can (and will) be targeted as well. The concept rests on the exchange 
of data between each unit. Radio signals can very easily be either jammed or targeted, and this 
is also the case for signals traveling in outer space. Additionally, modern link systems today 
are already capable of doing much of what is described here. It is possible today for a surface 
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ship to receive the radar picture from a fighter aircraft and transmit engagement orders 
without ever speaking a word. These systems are certainly not limited to the U.S.  
 
The fact that capital ships can be sunk is nothing new, the torpedo, the submarine and 
airpower all had their respective soothsayers predicting the demise of capital ships. Each time 
however the nature of the capital ship developed, either by a counteraction or by another ship 
becoming the capital ship.  
 
Lastly, a very important aspect that is left out of this discussion is the psychological function 
of the capital ships. The ships are essentially built to prevent war by their deterrence value. 
The network concept mainly relates to its functions once hostilities have broken out. The 
concept, however, as proposed by Rubel does not include abandoning the aircraft carrier it 
simply suggests placing the “capital ship title” somewhere else. In the end it may be a matter 
of semantics, but their deterrent value is a significant part of what makes the capital ships 
capital and on that basis the network can not be the next capital ship.   
 
The ship 
For now the future appears to be somewhat static and the capital ship will remain in the form 
of the Ford-class of which the U.S. have decided to buy additional ships. 
 
In its current form the capital ship have some potential challenges in the near future. 
 
The first challenge is economy. Acquisition costs for the Ford-class have become colossal 
(Mizokami, 2017, p. 3), and it has the potential to become unaffordable for all – including the 
United States. It may be cheaper to run than the Nimitz-class, but the same can probably not 
be said about its aircraft.  
Costs can lead to a condition where it is not technology that determines the capital ship, 
because state of the art technology has become unobtainable. 
 
The second challenge is the test of war. If the capital ships were put to the test in a war with 
another capable navy and fails – this would certainly lead to changing paradigms. No capital 
ship has fought a peer competitor since World War II, and according to U.S. naval strategy 
their actual role in war a war is very vaguely defined. What modern anti-ship missiles and 
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indeed anti-ship ballistic missiles are actually capable of is also an unknown factor. Therefore, 
the next war can be decisive in determining if the capital ship will continue to have relevance 
in its current form.    
A third challenge could be a Dreadnought-type revolution. It is difficult, however, to predict 
what (if any) will become the next “all big gun” or turbine propulsion concept.  
Within this discussion it is important to note, that the Ford-class has to some extent been 
future-proofed, as it is being built to accommodate future technologies in the form of sensors, 
weapons etc. (Keck, 2018).  
 
An additional aspect of this is also the fact, that the next “all big gun concept” could be so 
expensive that no country will be able to afford it. But that is of course, based on the 
assumption that the development of capital ships will follow its until now linear history. 
Meaning, that each new capital ship so far has been bigger, more powerful and more 
expensive than the ship it replaced. If that is not the case, then some other asset, an 
autonomous vehicle or something similar might be able to challenge the supercarrier’s status. 
This would of course require that the deterrent value inherently connected with size and 
firepower be replaced by something else. 
 
Steve Wills writes that changes in capital ship concepts historically stems from a combination 
of new technology and changes in the financial and/or strategic situation (Wills, 2017, p. 1). 
These points are addressed through the three challenges discussed above.  
 
The so-called high/low mix, proposed by McCain and others, of having a fleet of 
supercarriers supplemented by a fleet of lighter carriers is not a challenger to contemporary 
capital ship thinking. The concept still retains a number of supercarriers in order to deter and 
defeat near peer adversaries.  
 
Proceeding with the Ford-class may also be the simplest and cheapest solution. Designing a 
new and different type of ship would cost a lot of time, and money. The Ford-class is already 
here. It really is just a case of deciding on how many you want. These reasons, where also 
among the primary reasons that Congress decided to proceed with the Ford-class (O’Rourke, 
2018, p. 29). Procuring supercarriers is a very long-term project. The second Ford-class 
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carrier was procured in fiscal year 2013, partially funded 2007-2012, fully funded 2013-2018 
and scheduled for delivery to the Navy in 2024 (O’Rourke, 2018, p. 1).  
 
Additionally there are a lot of other factors that supports choosing the path that is already laid. 
The U.S. Navy have worked with supercarriers since the USS Enterprise was launched in 
1961. These ships have been the centrepieces for more than 50 years. Changing the direction 
and paradigms of an organisation like the U.S. Navy, and probably also most of the Military 
and policymakers in Washington is not something that is done overnight. There are certainly 
individuals that argue against a carrier centred navy, but most governmental organisations 
appear to be biased toward the supercarrier.  
Furthermore, as this study has demonstrated, the supercarrier has a significant symbolic value 
within the U.S. and within the Navy in particular. This could lead to the fact that the ship 
needs to fail in a war or in another way become evidently obsolete before its status will even 
be considered.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this paragraph, for now the U.S. Navy is determined to 
continue the Ford-class programme gradually replacing the fleet of Nimitz-class supercarriers. 
The Navy does however need a lot more Ford-classes if the Nimitz fleet is to be replaced 1:1. 
It is therefore not to late to change direction after the three or four first Ford-classes have 
been delivered. However, as things stands now, this does not appear to be likely – unless of 
course one of the three proposed challenges are realised.  
 
7.5. Summary capital influence in a competitive world and beyond (2014-) 
This chapter have demonstrated how the role of the capital ship is still very significant in the 
U.S. Navy, and that the aircraft carrier is likely to keep this status for the considerable future.  
 
Navies are becoming increasingly expensive to run, and supercarriers are also becoming more 
and more expensive to build. Despite these facts, Ford-class procurements have been 
expedited, which was a very likely result of the increased great power competition. Officials 
in Washington considered alternatives to the Ford-class, but in the end they decided to 
continue with what they knew. A conclusion that was also proposed by a government funded 
RAND report.  
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There were voices arguing the case of a high/low mix fleet, and Congress has made funds 
available to developing a preliminary light carrier design.  
 
The capital ships were very significant within the diplomatic role, and references to the capital 
ships were very value laden. They were referred to as the crown jewel and the air wing was 
described as the mailed fist of deterrence.  
The diplomatic role rests entirely on the concept of Forward Presence. According to the U.S. 
Navy, this concept ensures peace and stability and capital ships are the centrepieces. In other 
words, capital ships ensure peace.   
 
Within the military role, there have been interesting developments. The challenge of sea 
control on the high seas is now seen as a challenge for the first time in the post Cold War era. 
The historical strong link between capital ships and this mission appears to have been diluted. 
Distributed Lethality is the concept, with which the Navy addresses this classic naval mission. 
Surface combatants and not capital ships are the centrepieces of the concept. Whether the 
concept is realistic or not is an interesting question, but the fact remains that capital ships are 
not envisioned any role in this concept or within the sea control mission in general. Capital 
ships are however intended a significant role within strike warfare.   
 
Despite this, the future of capital ships in the U.S. Navy appears to be set. The network is 
definitely coming, and it is probably already here. But, it is not a challenge to either the 
supercarrier or the capital ship term. It can not replace its symbolic value or non-wartime 
functions, which may one and the same.  
It appears, that the only thing that is able to challenge the supercarrier as the capital ship is a 
major war, where it fails or a technological achievement that renders the supercarrier obsolete 
to everyone.  
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8. Understanding capital influence within U.S. naval strategy since 1992 
This chapter will provide a short summary of the three periods covered in the preceding 
chapters. The periods will be compared and contrasted and thus serve as a transition to the 
conclusion in the next chapter. The chapter will follow the same methodology as the three 
preceding chapters, thus beginning with fleet structure before addressing the capital ship’s 
proposed role within diplomatic and military mission.  
 
Among the key findings is the fact that that the capital ship’s role in U.S. naval strategy is 
significant, but rather psychological. In the study’s first two periods, the capital ships where 
the centrepiece of U.S. peacetime power projection capabilities. This was a world where no 
one could challenge them militarily. In many ways, they were the symbols of U.S. supremacy. 
 
Great power competition has so far not changed this psychological role, but it has changed 
their role in securing sea control in times of hostilities – a task that is a part of the capital ship 
definition. The study has demonstrated that when faced with a near peer competitor, the 
military role of capital ships is not clear.   
 
8.1. Fleet Structure 
The conceptual approach throughout the three periods has been a fleet structure designed 
around the capital ships.  
 
The collaboration with the Marine Corps was very significant in 90s where the Navy saw 
itself as an enabler in relation to operations ashore – most certainly based on the lessons from 
the first Gulf War. Amphibious assault ships were widely regarded as capital ships as well. 
Arguably this was a period where the Navy struggled to define its purpose. With no one left to 
fight at sea it was therefore opportune to adopt the “From the sea approach” and articulate a 
strong link with the Marine Corps and supporting troops ashore in general.  
The Global War on Terror did not do much to change this approach, as terrorism, for the 
most, part did not put to sea.  
 
The threats from near peer competitors (e.g. the superior Chinese anti-ship capability) were 
among the reasons that Ford-class programme was revaluated. These threats were also key 
reasons behind the Distributed Lethality concept, in which the capital ships does not have a 
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significant role, but this concept has not yet been backed up with significant changes in fleet 
structure.   
 
This discussion and the somewhat competing concepts are seen as challengers and not as 
changes as such because the fleet is still structured in much the same way as it was in the 90s, 
but the envisioned employment has changed, which the next sections will address. Over time, 
this can perhaps lead to changes within fleet structure as well. These changes could be a 
significant increased number of surface combatants and/or introduction of light carriers.  
 
8.2. The Diplomatic Role 
Capital ships have had a significant part of this role throughout all three periods. However, as 
great power competition emerged the role became more outspoken and symbolical. 
 
In the 1990s the capital ship became synonymous with the United States as the world’s only 
superpower. Capital ships are, by their nature, very symbolic and this, along with their strike 
capability was what mattered in the 1990s and in the first half of the collaborative period.  
Forward Presence became the concept used to exert U.S. influence in the World. The capital 
ships were the centrepiece of this concept and have remained so to this day. Other ships have 
diplomatic value as well, and this has been a prevailing tendency throughout all three periods. 
Tomahawk missiles and BMD capabilities have given the surface combatants a diplomatic 
role as well. In addition to this, the role as the world’s sole superpower required the U.S. to be 
present in many areas of the world – certainly more than they have capital ships. The capital 
ship’s top spot have, however, not been questioned and the areas that were most important to 
the U.S. had capital ships, and this is still mostly the case today. The capital ships have a 
symbolic value that is unprecedented.   
 
In 2010 a U.S. carrier was planned to take part in an exercise in the Yellow Sea with South 
Korean forces, but after several objections from China the exercise area was altered (Spegele, 
2010). This is an example of how a potential adversary sees the presence of a capital ship in 
an area that they regard as vital. China hardly expected that this should be seen as an attack on 
China, whereby we return to the symbolic value of such a ship. The U.S. uses this symbolic 
value extensively. In early 2018, a carrier strike group conducted a port visit in Vietnam, in 
what was no doubt a clear message to China (Beech, 2018).  
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The return to great power competition was also very visible in U.S. naval strategy. The 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Seapower was updated in 2015 because of this competition and 
it is therefore interesting to compare differences in how capital ships are portrayed in the two 
versions.  
 
The capital ships were a more “visible” and featured tool in the new strategy. A carrier strike 
group is mentioned 11 times in the 2015 strategy but not even once in the 2007 version.  
This clearly supports that a world where great power politics have returned, a capital ship is a 
very important symbol.  
 
Their diplomatic importance has undoubtedly increased as the competition increased. But, this 
is not exactly the case with their role within the military role, which the next section will 
address.   
 
8.3. The Military Role 
The capital ships were very important as the primary striking arm of a power projection Navy 
in the unipolar and collaborative periods. As other powers appeared on the world stage, and 
threats materialised capital ships’ military role became much more withdrawn.   
 
A capital ship’s most important feature is of course its capability to perform strikes through 
its air wing, and this remained the same throughout. What changed is the context in which this 
was utilised. The context around the carrier changed and because of this it can be argued that 
its military value has decreased since 1992.  
 
In the 90s and the first half of the collaborative period the Navy could, for the most, part 
deploy its carriers and amphibious ships to any part of the world from where they would 
project power without ever considering any significant threats. This changed during the 
collaborative period, when the rise of A2/AD began threatening U.S. access to certain areas of 
the world. The capital ships were a significant part in countering this, their envisioned task 
was to secure access and then provide air cover to the force that would be fighting in the 
littorals. This development corresponds, to a large extent, with the classical capital ship role 
of securing sea control.  
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When some of the A2/AD threats developed into near peer competitors the possibility of 
having to fight for sea control on the high sea, something that was considered implicit until 
now, the role of capital ships was reduced. Within the context of securing sea control on the 
high seas, the capital ship’s role is not defined at all. Instead it is the surface combatants that 
are designated as the fighting force.  
 
The capital ship’s role within military mission is still there, their ability to strike from the sea 
is as important as ever but this ability is not incorporated at all within the sea control mission. 
In fact, within this context the capital ship’s role is not described at all.   
One of the very likely reasons behind this development is the threats that such a force is likely 
to face. It is no secret that Chinas has developed their capabilities specifically to target aircraft 
carriers (Erickson, 2013, p. 27).  
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9. Conclusion 
This thesis has investigated the role of the capital ship in U.S. Naval strategy since 1992. 
However, before such an analysis could take place it was first necessary to define a capital 
ship and subsequently identify some key characteristics and place them into context with the 
naval trinity. Within the diplomatic role these were the missions of presence and preventive 
diplomacy and coercion. Within the military role, it was the mission of securing sea control 
and the conduct of operations from the sea.   
 
These characteristics helped create a methodology for investigating the capital ships’ role 
within U.S. naval strategy.  
 
Within U.S. fleet structure the capital ships role is very much implicit, and publically at least 
it is not close to being an object for discussion by the Navy itself. From the political side, 
however, discussions are present, especially as great power politics returned, but until now it 
has not changed the role of the capital ship. The only thing that is clear, is that the political 
side is at least considering a high/low mix since funds have been made available to investigate 
a light carrier design.  
 
Within the diplomatic mission the capital ship has quite significant symbolic value, especially 
within missions of showing presence. This suggests a substantial symbolic role, which this 
thesis supports. This role became clearer and more expressed as great power competition 
appeared.  
 
The military mission can be presented from two perspectives, and both would be true. The 
first will claim that the capital ship’s central role in performing strike missions have been 
central throughout, perhaps even becoming more dominant since the surface combatants are 
not envisioned in this role in the latter part of the period in question. The second perspective 
will argue that as great power competition grew the military role of the capital ship did the 
exact opposite. This ship is referred to as the crown jewel in the U.S. Navy, and historically, 
in times of hostilities, crown jewels were kept safe far from the front. 
 
If these findings are combined they tell the story of a U.S. Navy that places a significant 
amount of trust in the deterrent value of their capital ships. If deterrence fails and the Navy is 
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forced to secure sea control against peer adversary capital ships are not the preferred weapons. 
This fact essentially means that they are no longer capital ships – at least not according to the 
definition put forward in this thesis. There can however, be little doubt that the U.S. considers 
the supercarrier the most important ship of its time – its more than that, it is the crown jewel.  
 
The future of the aircraft carrier as the U.S. Navy capital ship 
For the near term, the future appears to be somewhat static. This is due to the fact that the 
U.S. has decided to continue with the plan of building Ford-class supercarriers to gradually 
replace the Nimitz-class. However, there are still a lot more hulls that needs to be approved by 
Congress before the Nimitz-class is replaced 1:1, which means that things can be turned 
around. However, at this point a change is not considered likely. 
 
Furthermore, when discussing a replacement for the supercarrier as the capital ship, it is 
important to consider the findings of this thesis, which argues that the supercarrier is mostly 
valued for its psychological value, and this is hardly replaced by a system or an unmanned 
vehicle of some sort. A key question is therefore, what is that needs to be replaced? This 
question will be addressed later in the section.  
 
Subchapter 7.4 discussed the future of the supercarrier as the capital ship, and some of the 
possibilities mentioned there can still materialise. The network will definitely materialise, to 
some extent it probably already has. It is, however, highly unlikely that it replaces the 
supercarrier or the capital ship paradigm. As this thesis has demonstrated, the psychological 
value of the supercarrier is very significant.  
This psychological value is also connected to the size, prestige and power of such a ship. All 
this, is a case against replacing the supercarrier with something smaller.  
 
Subchapter 7.4 also discussed possible challenges to the supercarriers’ status as the capital 
ship. These where economy, a war or a Dreadnought-type-revolution.  The first two does not 
appear likely in the near future, although some argue that U.S.-Sino relations have potential to 
develop into a clash at sea (Tunsjø, 2017, pp. 296-298). However, will it be of a magnitude 
with the potential to challenge current paradigms or will it be a limited clash?  
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Regarding the economy, it is not likely that the U.S. will decide to slow down on military 
investments in a time of great power competition. The dreadnought-type-revolution is 
therefore the most likely of the three, since technology does change warfare all the time.  
 
I will now return to the question that I raised earlier, what is it that needs to be replaced? Is it 
even possible to replace something with a psychological value that has been built up since 
World War II? It is likely that the supercarrier as the U.S. capital ship has developed into 
something that is irreplaceable for the U.S. If that is the case, it will probably take nothing 
less than a major war to change this line of thinking.  
 
The future of the capital ship in general 
The United States is now again procuring capital ships. China has an aircraft carrier program 
of their own, and the Russian carrier has been on several very public deployments in recent 
years.  
These are the nations that U.S. documents typically refers to in relation to great power 
competition. Other nations like France, Britain. and India are also either developing new 
carriers or operating their own. In Japan there is an on going debate about whether they 
should convert existing helicopter destroyers into aircraft carriers or not. It seems safe to say 
that all these nations, except for Japan have interests far beyond their borders and a desire to 
be able to influence these24.   
 
Capital ships are therefore what nations bring out when the want to exert their influence 
beyond their borders and when they want the rest of the world to take notice. With more great 
powers, logic would dictate that there is also likely to become more capital ships.  
 
Further areas of research  
The link between the task of securing sea control and the capital ship is an interesting area for 
further study. In the U.S. Navy this link has almost vanished. But is this a general trend within 
naval warfare or is just an American approach?  
Major navies, and capital ships have not fought have each other for more than 70 years. This 
raises many questions about what may happen in a major war at sea.  
                                                
24 The debate in Japan is specifically concerning the ability to defend the Senkaku Islands. Additionally, the 
Japanese constitution does not allow the country to possess offensive weapons. This all leads to the Japanese 
case being very complicated.   
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The weakened link between sea control and capital ships in U.S. naval strategy is certainly 
because of a fear of loosing a capital ship. U.S. capital ships have become enormously 
expensive and their psychological value has grown so high, that the risk of loosing such a ship 
seems incomprehensible, but how is this viewed in other navies? Of course other navies does 
not have ships of this size, but their relative value in terms of personnel, materiel and fighting 
power will be significant for the individual country. 
 
A study like this is also relevant to conduct on other nations, both western and non-western. 
China is a very interesting case for any student of naval strategy. Their naval strategy is still 
being formulated, but it will be very interesting to see what approach they will be following. 
China has great interests at sea, and a logic consequence would be to follow the offensive 
school of seapower. They do have an aircraft carrier program of their own and they have 
begun to demonstrate presence on a more global scale in recent years.   
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